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In the hotly contested war on drugs, the most potent weapon used by law
enforcement is asset forfeiture.' Though asset forfeiture has been recognized
in the common law for over 200 years,2 it has experienced an explosive
increase in use during the last decade. This is a result of the passage of successive federal statutes, beginning with the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (Drug Abuse Control Act).3 The Drug
Abuse Control Act simplified the legal requirements for asset forfeiture and
gave police the incentive to pursue property in addition to the criminals who

* This note received the Barbara W. Makar Writing Award as the outstanding note for
the Fall 1994 semester.
** To my wife Mary Ann whose support and understanding made this effort possible.
1. Asset forfeiture, as used in this note, involves the seizure and subsequent judicial
forfeiture of property by law enforcement under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
2. For a complete discussion of forfeiture's historical application in Anglo-American law,
see Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-86 (1974). The Court reaffirmed
the Calero-Toledo version of the historical origins of forfeiture in the decision of Austin v.
United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). See infra note 12 for further discussion of the
historical context of forfeiture. However, both Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy authored
concurring opinions taking exception to the majority's version of the doctrine's origins.
Neither was specific in their criticisms, but both indicated that they felt the majority had
mischaracterized the punitive aspects of the predecessors of modem forfeiture. Austin, 113
S. Ct. at 2812-15. Justices Thomas and Rehnquist joined in Justice Kennedy's opinion. Id.
at 2815.
3. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (1970) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 881 (1988)). Other federal statutes also provide for asset forfeiture for non-narcotics
offenses under procedures similar to those employed under 21 U.S.C. § 881. Most notable
are the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992) and its companion statute, the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act,
21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)
(money laundering, mail fraud and wire fraud).
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possess it.
Law enforcement has enthusiastically embraced the congressional mandate in support of asset forfeiture.4 Nearly $650 million in property was
seized in 1991, a fifty percent increase over the prior year.5 This rate of
growth is not exceptional.6 Because a large portion of the proceeds from
forfeiture is returned to the seizing police department, law enforcement has
viewed forfeiture as a way to increase its funding.7 These proceeds have enabled state and federal legislators to benefit from better funded law
enforcement departments without reallocating tax dollars.8
However, the expansion of government seizure power has not come
without costs. The wide net that Congress created to ensnare the kingpins
of illegal narcotics has also snared unintended targets, 9 and law enforcement
has not always thrown back the extra catch. 10 The simplified procedures for
seizure created by the federal statutes have made it possible to seize property

4. This mandate was rigorously enforced by the Executive Branch during the Reagan
Administration. In March 1988, then Attorney General Edwin Meese announced the "Zero
Tolerance" policy, which approved seizures of any property associated with drug use without
regard to considerations of proportionality or equity. The example cited by Meese in
announcing the policy was the forfeiture of a yacht, valued at over $250,000, because one of
the guests without the consent of the owner possessed a small amount of marihuana.
Memorandum from Attorney General Edwin Meese III to all United States Attorneys 2 (Mar.
30, 1988) (Combined Zero Tolerance/User) (as cited in Michael Schecter, Fearand Loathing
in the Forfeiture Laws, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1152 n.8 (1990)).
The new policy was announced as targeting casual users of narcotics rather than those
responsible for its distribution and sale. Arguably, this new emphasis deviated from the
original legislative intent. William Patrick Nelson, Should the Ranch Go Free Because the
ConstableBlundered? Gaining Compliance with Search and Seizure Standards in the Age of
Asset Forfeiture, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1309, 1316 n.42 (1992) (referring to S, REP. No. 225, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 191, 195 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374, and in H.R.
REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 7 (1984), which jointly point to the effect of the
1984 amendment as permitting the seizure of drug warehouses and production facilities); see
also Schecter, supra, at 1155 nn.33-40 and accompanying text.
5. Nelson, supra note 4, at 1324.
6. Id. As recently as 1985, law enforcement had seized only $27 million during the
year. Id.
7. Id. at 1327 (quoting DEA publications as stating that "forfeitures produce vast
amounts of revenue. Law enforcement has the potential, through forfeiture, of producing more
income than it spends. With tax dollars becoming scarce, forfeiture holds the promise of
improving drug enforcement and the method to use the assets of violators to support
enforcement activities."); see United States v. 429 South Main St., 52 F.3d 1416, 1419 (6th
Cir. 1995) ("Civil asset forfeiture has become an important law enforcement tool, not simply
to remove from criminals the spoils of crime, but to supplement law enforcement budgets.").
8. Nelson, supra note 4, at 1330-31.
9. See generally Andrew Schneider & Mary P. Flaherty, Presumed Guilty: The Law's
Victims in the War on Drugs, PITrSBURGH PRESS, Aug. 11-16, 1991, at AI (multi-part series).
10. Id. See infra note 93 indicating that even when confronted with an arguably unjustified seizure, prosecutors will attempt to require a "contribution" in order to release the
assets without contest.
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even if the original owner has not been charged with a crime."
This note explores the normative issues presented by asset forfeiture,
specifically as provided in the Drug Abuse Control Act. First, the note
provides an abbreviated history of the practice of criminal forfeiture prior to
the Act. The second section of the note explains the procedural requirements
for taking title to property under the Act, as developed by the courts. The
third and fourth sections analyze decisions from the United States Supreme
Court and the Eleventh Circuit, illustrating the differences in the Eleventh
Circuit's interpretation of the Act. Finally, the note applies normative
concepts and offers curative suggestions that, if adopted by the courts, would
make the practice of asset forfeiture more closely reflect society's original
goals in passing the Drug Abuse Control Act.
I.

HISTORY

The practice of asset forfeiture traces its roots back to English common
law.' 2 The common law doctrine of deodand, whose justification derived
from the Bible, 3 required the owner of an object that accidentally caused
the death of another to render payment to the Crown. 4 Payment was not
contingent upon any finding of guilt or liability on
the part of the owner;
15
instead, the property itself was viewed as "guilty."
Early common law use of the forfeiture law was restricted primarily to
suits in admiralty. 6 Ships violating maritime law were routinely seized
along with their contents.' 7 Admiralty seizures were a direct extension of
the deodand, which required that objects whose motion caused offense be
liable for the resulting damage.' 8 Because an offending ship could quickly
leave the jurisdiction, and because of the difficulty in proceeding against

11. See Schecter, supra note 4, at 1163-72.
12. The Supreme Court decision, Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993), places

the historical development of forfeiture in a slightly different line than the majority of prior
authorities who have addressed the subject. In the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun lists
three types of forfeiture recognized in English common law: deodand, criminal forfeiture
following a conviction for a felony or treason, and statutory forfeiture. Id. at 2807. While
most commentators have traced modem forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881 back to the practice
of deodand, discussed infra at note 14, the Austin opinion found modem forfeiture to be the
joint product of deodand and "the belief that the right to own property could be denied the
wrongdoer." Id. (quoting Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Co., 416 U.S 663, 682 (1974)).
13. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681 n.17 (referring to Exodus 21:28 which states, "If an
ox gore a man or a woman, and they die, he shall be stoned and his flesh shall not be eaten.").
14. The term deodand is derived from the Latin term Deo dandum, literally, "given to
God." Id. at 680 n.16.
15. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 25-30 (1923).

16. United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453, 456 (7th Cir. 1980).
17. Id. at 460; see also Austin v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 2807 (1993).
18. Schecter, supra note 4, at 1152.
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vessels that may have had as many as fifty owners, simplified procedures in
admiralty seizures were justified."
Aside from admiralty seizures and some other isolated seizures,20 criminal forfeiture was virtually unknown in the United States legal system until
its modem application in the enforcement of narcotics laws. 21 To combat
the narcotics trade, Congress explicitly authorized the use of forfeiture in the
Drug Abuse Control Act.22 Significantly, this same session of Congress
passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),
which also employed forfeiture as a law enforcement method.23
The Drug Abuse Control Act specified a limited number of items subject
to forfeiture. 24 Generally, only equipment and apparatus used in narcotics
production and storage were forfeitable. 25 Section (a)(4) of the Act provided an exception for the seizure of conveyances used to transport narcotics,
including boats, planes and cars.26 Police departments used the Act infrequently during the first decade of its existence, perhaps because the Act
limited the scope of items subject to forfeiture.2 7
Congress amended the Drug Abuse Control Act in 1978. With the addition of subsection (a)(6), the list of forfeitable property grew to include cash
and negotiable securities used in transactions involving controlled substances.28 Under the amended Act, law enforcement could seize anything of

19. Id. at 1153.
20. The Austin court listed various examples of the use of forfeiture during the days of
the early republic. Forfeiture of goods was proscribed as punishment for improper harbor
loading and violation of customs laws. Also, not surprisingly, the Confederacy proceeded in
rem against various properties owned by Union interests during the Civil War. 113 S. Ct. at
2807-08.
21. Id. at 2806-07.
22. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513,

§ 511.
23. Legislative history common to both acts suggests the search for novel methods of law
enforcement to combat a menace viewed as unmanageable by conventional means. "What is
needed here ... are new approaches that will deal not only with individuals, but also with the
economic base through which these individuals constitute such a serious threat to the
economic well-being of the Nation." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969).
24. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(l)-(4) (1988 & Supp. I 1990).
25. Nelson, supra note 4, at 1315.
26. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4).
27. Nelson, supra note 4, at 1315.
28. Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301(a), 92 Stat. 3768,
3777 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988)). 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) provides for:
[a]ll moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished
or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in
violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all
moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to facilitate any
violation of this subchapter.
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value2 9 exchanged during an illegal transaction.3" As a result, all "profits"
from drug trafficking were subject to forfeiture. 3
As expected, law enforcement approved of the 1978 amendment. In the
first year after the amendment took effect, the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) increased its forfeiture gains by over 2000%.32 Other agencies
quickly followed the DEA's lead.33
Congress widened the scope of drug-related forfeitures even further in
1984 when it added subsection (a)(7) to the Drug Abuse Control Act. This
addition approved the seizure of real property interests used to facilitate the
sale of controlled substances.34 Prosecutors found that subsections (a)(6)
and (a)(7), when read together, greatly increased the potential amount of
property subject to forfeiture from any single police action.3 5 If an illegal
transaction included a phone call placed or received at the house of the
perpetrator, the entire property could be subject to forfeiture, regardless of the
size of the transaction.36 Forfeitures of drug trafficking proceeds, including
37
real property, soon became the largest category of recorded forfeitures.
By any measure, asset forfeiture has become a widely accepted law
enforcement tactic in the war on drugs. Over one-half billion dollars in assets
were forfeited in 1991 alone.3" Increased scrutiny of widespread forfeitures,
however, may reverse that trend. For example, real estate associations have
opposed the seizure of commercial properties.3 9 In addition, large seizures
have attracted the attention of the media.4" More importantly, Congress has
29. Nelson, supra note 4, at 1315.
30. This broad description included both the cash supplied to purchase narcotics and all
the "proceeds" of the trade. United States v. All that Tract (Riverdale), 696 F. Supp. 631
(N.D. Ga. 1988).
31. In fact, authorities have even seized and taken ownership of a working horse ranch
under this provision. United States v. D.K.G. Appaloosas, Inc., 829 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1987).
32. Nelson, supra note 4, at 1315-16.
33. Id. at 1325.
34. Id.
35. The combination of the two amendments has been interpreted as allowing the
forfeiture of real property "used" to facilitate drug sales. Evidence of congressional intent
suggests that this amendment was aimed at "warehouses" of drug production. "[I]f he [the
drug trafficker] uses a secluded barn to store tons of marihuana or uses his house as a
manufacturing laboratory, ... there is no provision to subject his real property to civil forfeiture, even though its use was indispensable to the commission of a major drug offense .... "
Nelson, supra note 4, at 1316 n.25 (quoting S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191, 206
(1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374). In practice, the two amendments are
used to forfeit property whose use in facilitating drug transactions is much less direct.
36. United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1990).
37. Nelson, supra note 4, at 1317-18.
38. Id. at 1324.
39. See H. Jane Leman, Drug Seizure Becomes a Hot Topic, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 2, 1990, at
NI (covering the annual convention of the National Association of Realtors, specifically a
session concerning the effect of the forfeiture laws on the industry).
40. See Schneider & Flaherty, supra note 9.
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begun to reconsider the Drug Abuse Control Act,4 while the Justice Depart42
ment institutes greater oversight procedures.
The judiciary is also retreating from its widespread approval of asset
forfeiture. 43 In United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 44 the Supreme
Court expanded the defenses available to claimants contesting forfeiture. In
addition, the Court mandated that the value of seized property not be
excessive4 5 and heightened the due process requirements necessary to effect
forfeiture. 46 Furthermore, the Court granted petition for certiorari to address
two circuit court decisions 47 which found that asset forfeiture also implicates
the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause.48 The circuits are in
disagreement over the proper interpretation of the 1984 amendment, which
may prompt further review from the Court in the near future.49 All this
41. At least two bills were introduced in past sessions of Congress that would have had
the effect of limiting forfeiture: (1) 1993 HR 3347, Asset Forfeiture Justice Act, introduced
by Rep. John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI) and (2) 1993 HR 2417, the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform
Act of 1993, introduced by Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R-ILL.). Neither was included in final
legislation. See Andrew Schneider & Lee Bowman, Senate, House to Probe Seizure Abuse,
PITTSBURGH PRESS, Nov. 17, 1991, at Al (detailing the announcement of hearings before the
Senate Judiciary Committee and the House Government Operations Committee regarding
police behavior in enforcing 21 U.S.C. § 881); see also Lynne Marek, Hyde Seeks to Curb
PropertySeizures by U.S., CHI. TRIB., June 16, 1993, at N2 (covering Rep. Henry Hyde's announcement that he intended to introduce legislation to shift the burden of proof to the government in forfeiture proceedings).
42. Lee Bowman, US. Developing Better Guidelines to Control Drug ForfeitureCases,
PITTSBURGH PRESS, Jan. 24, 1992, at Al; Washington Brief - - Agency Watch, NAT'L L.J.,
May 2, 1994, at A12.
43. See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993); Austin v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993), discussed at infra text accompanying notes 161-96.
44. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993). For a complete discussion of the impact of 92 Buena Vista
Ave., see infra notes 75-77, 148-60.
45. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2801.
46. United States v. James Daniel Good Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
47. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 762 (1996). In both cases, the government first
obtained criminal convictions and sentenced the offenders before initiating separate actions
seeking forfeiture of assets. United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995); United
States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994). Both circuits found the practice to be
a violation of the double jeopardy clause. Ursery, 59 F.3d at 575; $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at
1222. It also should be noted that the Supreme Court has approved of a similar practice.
United States v. Libretti, 116 S. Ct. 356, 363 (1995).
The petitioner in Libretti accepted a plea bargain in which he pled guilty under 21
U.S.C. § 848 to engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise and surrendered various items
of property. Id. at 358. Following the plea entry, the trial judge entered a forfeiture order,
which the petitioner contested because there was no independent factual finding supporting
forfeiture made by a jury. Id. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
rejected both contentions in turn because asset forfeiture was considered punishment for the
criminal offense rather than an element of the offense. Id. at 361, 369.
48. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be out twice in jeopardy
for life or limb ....
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
49. The circuits are not in accord regarding the degree of connection necessary between
the property and the offense in order to trigger forfeiture. For a complete discussion of the
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scrutiny will most likely alter the practice of asset forfeiture.5 0 Such alterwill probably affect the Act procedurally rather than
ations, however,
5I
substantively.
II.

PROCEDURES FOR ASSET FORFEITURE UNDER
THE DRUG ABUSE CONTROL ACT

Asset forfeiture is not ordinarily viewed as a criminal prosecution, but as
remedial civil litigation. 2 Accordingly, forfeitures do not require an adjudication of guilt and are therefore not subject to the procedural safeguards
granted criminal defendants. 3 Forfeiture actions, descendants of the
differences between the respective rulings, see infra note 65.
50. The avenue for this change may have been provided in Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2801.
Austin continued the Supreme Court's general disapproval of forfeiture as begun in 92 Buena
Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1126. However, the Austin Court went beyond the 92 Buena Vista
Ave. decision in providing a substantive basis for limiting forfeiture. The Austin Court viewed
forfeiture as punitive, and therefore, approved of the applicability of an Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis. For a more complete discussion of the impact of the Austin decision,
see infra notes 99 & 181.
Significantly, all nine Justices in Austin agreed that forfeiture meted out excessive
punishments within the purview of the Eighth Amendment; however, four Justices chose to
express themselves via concurring opinions due to disagreement with the majority's general
branding of forfeiture as punishment in all its applications. Id. at 2812, 2815.
51. Austin was arguably a substantive retreat from the forfeiture doctrine. Though its
eventual application will be procedural, the proportionality analysis for which the decision
called can be viewed as weighing against the harshness of the doctrine. Additionally, in 1994
the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case of Bennis v. State, 527 N.W.2d 483
(Mich. 1994). Bennis involved the Michigan nuisance abatement statutes, M.C.L. § 600.3801
and M.S.A. § 27A.3801, which, read in tandem, permit the "abatement" of property
considered a public nuisance to the benefit of the state. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 487-89. In
this case, the prosecutor filed a complaint seeking abatement of the Bennis' automobile after
Mr. Bennis had been charged with "gross indecency"; he had solicited a prostitute, who was
caught performing a sex act in the vehicle. Id. at 486. Though 21 U.S.C. § 881 is not
involved in the Bennis decision, the case bears watching since Mrs. Bennis challenged the
abatement of her interest in the vehicle on due process grounds, asserting that any forfeiture
statute has an implied innocent-owner defense like that enumerated in 21 U.S.C. § 881. Brief
for Petitioner, Bennis v. Michigan (No. 94-8729) at 14.
Like Austin, the court's eventual ruling in Bennis may represent a substantive
disapproval of the modem practice of forfeiture clothed in a procedural application. In
contrast, the recent James Daniel Good decision affects the procedural heart of forfeiture
practice by holding the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause applicable despite a strong dissent to the contrary by Chief Justice Rehnquist. 114 S. Ct. at 500. The Court distinguished
prior case law, holding that the Fourth Amendment alone controlled the seizure of property
within a criminal context. Forfeiture, by its nature, involves the seizure of property for the
government's use, not for evidentiary value. Thus, the Court reasoned forfeiture to be
analogous to the governmental seizures of property as contemplated within the Fifth
Amendment. Id.
52. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803.
53. For a detailed listing of the respective pre-Austin and pre-James Daniel Good
procedural rights granted claimants in forfeiture proceedings, see Schecter, supra note 4, at
1163-72. The view of forfeiture as a remedial civil proceeding, while technically correct, has
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deodand, are regarded as in rem civil proceedings against the offending
doctrine requires that the law adopt
property.54 Like the deodand, forfeiture
55
the fiction of "guilty property."
Asset forfeiture under the Drug Abuse Control Act is not analogous to
the long-accepted police practice of seizing contraband.56 Consequently,
property owners who contest forfeiture are characterized as claimants, not
defendants.57 This distinction has led courts to label forfeiture actions as
"quasi-criminal., 58 The quasi-criminal label describes a mix of procedures
and privileges that includes provisions from both civil and criminal practices.5 9
All federal drug-related forfeitures are governed by the Drug Abuse
Control Act, whose provisions are triggered upon the initial seizure of property.60 Property discovered during an arrest or execution of a search warrant 6l may be seized as long as the police have probable cause to deem the

been challenged by various courts. See United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210, 1219 (9th
Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court also has most likely conceded that forfeiture is punishment.
United States v. Libretti, 116 S. Ct. 356, 363 (1995) ("Congress plainly intended forfeiture of
assets to operate as punishment for criminal conduct in violation of the federal drug and
racketeering laws .... ).
54. This distinction has resulted in rather unusual case names, such as: Various Items of
Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931), United States v. One Assortment of
89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984), United States v. $38,000 in United States Currency, 816
F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1987), United States v. 42450 Hwy. 441, 920 F.2d 900 (11th Cir. 1991)
and United States v. Proceeds from the Sale of Approximately 15,538 Panalirus Argus Lobster
Tails, 834 F. Supp. 385 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
The in rem nature of these proceedings also has led to some confusing and humorous
occurrences. "Feeling somewhat foolish at having expressed ... any expectation that it would
receive a response from an inanimate parcel of real property . . . this court ...

appointed

counsel for the said real property in rem." United States v. 632-636 Ninth Ave., 798 F. Supp.
1540, 1543 (N.D. Ala. 1992) (explaining the court's decision to exercise its inherent powers
to appoint counsel to represent the real property, an occurrence the court conceded unusual).
55. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2808-09 (justifying forfeiture on the theory that "the property
itself is 'guilty' of the offense").
56. Id. at 2810-11.
57. United States v. One 1957 Rockwell Aero Commander 680 Aircraft, 671 F.2d 414,
415 (10th Cir. 1982). The James Daniel Good Court characterized the special status of the
former property owners by stating that "[a]ll that the seizure left him [Good] . . was the right
to bring a claim for the return of title at some unscheduled future hearing." James Daniel
Good, 114 S. Ct. at 501.
58. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
59. See Schecter, supra note 4, at 1163-72.
60. James Daniel Good, 114 S. Ct. at 503. Actual seizure was traditionally a prerequisite
to the establishment of jurisdiction in forfeiture proceedings. However, the James Daniel
Good Court ruled that the seizure of real property is not necessary to effect forfeiture due to
its immobile character. Id. at 500.
61. Property may be seized under the Act pursuant to traditional admiralty law as well.
Schecter, supra note 4, at 1156.
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property forfeitable under the statute.62 After seizure, the United States Attorney makes a determination of whether to pursue forfeiture of the
property.63 This process is initiated at a judicial proceeding 64 in which the
court decides whether there exists probable cause to believe that the property
facilitated a violation or constitutes the proceeds of a violation. 65 Once the
government establishes probable cause,66 the burden shifts to the claimant

62. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(1). In determining probable cause, the police are acting as
designees of the Attorney General. State and local police may also function under the federal
law through a practice commonly termed adoption. Adoption, otherwise known as equitable
sharing, allows the United States Attorney to prosecute the seizures by local law enforcement
as a violation of federal narcotics laws. If forfeiture is successful, the local police who initiated the seizure "share" in 90% of the proceeds. 19 U.S.C. § 1619 (1988). This practice has
resulted in nullifying states' attempts to govern forfeiture through the passage of statutes that
are stricter procedurally, thereby returning less of the proceeds to the seizing law enforcement
agency. Because the local law enforcement agency is guaranteed under federal practice, many
local agencies call in federal authorities. Nelson, supra note 4, at 1329.
The Florida statute closely parallels the federal act in allowing the seizing agency to
retain all of the value of the forfeited proceeds. FLA. STAT. § 932.7055 (1992).
63. Nelson, supra note 4, at 1318.
64. The Drug Abuse Control Act calls for forfeiture proceedings to conform to relevant
customs forfeiture practices as found at 19 U.S.C. § 1594-1619. Id. at 1319.
65. The circuits are in disagreement over the proper standard to find that the property was
intended to be used in a crime. The First, Fourth and Eighth Circuits require that the government prove a "substantial connection" between the property and the offense, while the
Seventh Circuit only requires that the property bear "more than an incidental or fortuitous
connection" to the offense. United States v. 42450 Hwy. 441 N. Fort Drum, 920 F.2d 900
(11 th Cir. 1991). The Eleventh Circuit has declined to adopt either standard as yet, although
the circuit's district courts apply the "substantial connection" test, citing Fifth Circuit cases
as authority. Id.; see also United States v. 4880 S.E. Dixie Hwy., 612 F. Supp. 1492, 1493
(S.D. Fla. 1985) (establishing the substantial connection test as part of probable cause
determination). This is one of the issues that may prompt future Supreme Court review.
66. The probable cause burden is not especially exacting upon the government's evidence.
Although probable cause is traditionally viewed as a procedural hurdle in the search for
evidence sufficient to apply to the state's case-in-chief, probable cause within forfeiture
context completely satisfies the state's required burden. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331
(1990). One court has indicated that probable cause is satisfied if the information upon which
the government relied is sufficiently credible to lead to a reasonable belief that the defendant
was involved in a crime. United States v. One 56-Foot Yacht Named Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276,
1281 n.3 (9th Cir. 1983). However, some district courts within the Eleventh Circuit have
required that the information relied upon in issuing the seizure warrant must meet a minimal
standard of specificity. See United States v. $364,960.00 in United States Currency, 661 F.2d
319, 329 (5th Cir. 1981).
Probable cause determination has led to one controversial practice of the forfeiture doctrine, that is, the use of drug courier "profiles." DEA agents stationed at the nation's busiest
airports employ profiles of drug courier behavior to determine likely candidates to stop and
search. Though the DEA has been understandably reluctant to discuss the details behind the
use of profiles, agents have testified under oath that approximately 75% of those stopped are
black. Andrew Schneider & Mary P. Flaherty, Presumed Guilty: The Way You Look,
PITTSBURGH PRESS, Aug. 12, 1991, at Al.
Affidavits have shown that the factors used in profiles may vary significantly. An airline passenger may draw suspicion because he or she is the first to deplane, showing undue
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to refute the government's evidence or to assert one of the appropriate defenses, such as the innocent-owner defense.6 7 Claimants may have
difficulty challenging the government's evidence since courts permit the
government to rely on confidential informants and police intuition. 6' Therefore, most claimants must rely upon the innocent-owner defense.69
The innocent-owner defense provides that a claimant challenging probable cause prove that the wrongful acts committed with the property occurred
without the "knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the owner."70
Courts have interpreted the statute as requiring owners to do "everything that
[they] can reasonably be expected to do to prevent the subject property from
being used to commit, or to facilitate the commission or violation of drug
laws."71 Under this standard, an owner aware of drug use or sales on his
haste or the last to deplane, trying to appear unconcerned. Id. Even those who deplane in the
center of a group may be searched because they were trying to lose themselves in a crowd.
In addition, making a phone call or looking at one's watch can make one a suspect. Id. All
of these behaviors have been held as valid factors in making a probable cause determination.
Id.
67. 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988) (stating that the claimant bears the burden of proof once
probable cause is established); see United States v. One 1957 Rockwell Aero Commander 680
Aircraft, 671 F.2d 414, 417 (10th Cir. 1982) ("Once the Government, as here, meets its initial
burden of showing probable cause for the institution of a forfeiture action, it is the claimant's
burden to prove that the requested forfeiture does not fit within the four corners of the statute.").
68. The United States Supreme Court has restricted the access of contesting parties to
confidential government witnesses. In order to learn the identity of the informant, the
contestant must bear the burden of proving that disclosure of the informant is materially vital
to a fair trial. United States v. Curtis, 965 F.2d 610, 614 (8th Cir. 1992); see McCray v.
Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 307 (1967) ("[W]e accept the premise that the informer is a vital part
of society's defensive arsenal. The basic rule protecting his identity rests on that belief.").
In practice, this standard is met by making reference to a specific action by the
informant that has prejudiced the claimant. Examples of such action include the specifics of
an alleged "deal" between the prosecutor and the informant or references to specific
untruthfulness on the part of the informant that makes him/her a ripe prospect for impeachment. Curtis, 965 F.2d. at 614. Obviously, this standard is nearly impossible to meet if the
claimant is not aware of the informant's identity from an independent source. Id.
69. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4).
70. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C) (conveyances). The defense is also provided for the
proceeds of transactions other than real property at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) and real property
at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7).
The claimant's burden under all three subsections is a
preponderance of the evidence. The statute also contains provisions that exempt the owners
of stolen property used illegally and owners of common carriers where the owner is unaware
of the presence of drugs. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(A), (B). The "willful blindness" standard has
the effect of imputing "constructive possession" of narcotics and paraphernalia found lying
about a residence to the owner. United States v. 5745 N.W. 110 St., 721 F. Supp. 287, 290
(S.D. Fla. 1989).
71. United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1504-05 (11 th Cir. 1992); see
Rockwell Aero Commander, 671 F.2d at 418 (explaining that an owner must do "all that could
reasonably be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property"). In proceedings
regarding cash, the claimant must show that the only potential sources of the income are legitimate. United States v. $41,305.00 in Currency, 802 F.2d 1339, 1345 (11th Cir. 1986).
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property must contact the police;72 otherwise, the owner cannot assert the
innocent-owner defense.73
Prior decisions also required bona fide purchaser status as a threshold to
the defense.74 The Supreme Court, however, recently struck down this requirement." Specifically, the Court ruled that an owner need not fall within
the property law designation of a bona fide purchaser in order to raise the defense.76
The Court also reversed earlier decisions that incorrectly applied the
common law relation-back doctrine to forfeiture proceedings. 77 Earlier appellate decisions held that title to the forfeited property passed at the moment
the illegal activity occurred.78 This reading was based upon section (h), a
1984 amendment to the statute, which provides that "title .. . vests in the
United States upon commission of the act . . . ,,79 Both court rulings
served to broaden the application of the innocent-owner defense.
If an owner's challenge to a forfeiture action fails, the owner may petition the Attorney General for remission or mitigation of the adverse forfeiture
ruling. 80 Remission or mitigation is analogous to the criminal law doctrine
of pardon and is granted sparingly.8 Less than three percent of property

72. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d at 1504-05.
73. Id.
74. One 1985 Nissan v. Walker, 889 F.2d 1317 (4th Cir. 1989); Eggleston v. Colorado,
873 F.2d 242, 245-48 (10th Cir. 1989).
75. United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1135 (1993). The Court also
gave indication that the forfeiture doctrine may be losing support. See id. In historical dicta
preceding the opinion, Justice Stevens compared modem forfeiture to the English use of
"general warrants" that were used to seize goods. Id. at 1132. The opinion pointed to the
unpopularity of the warrants as a contributing cause to the Revolutionary War. Id.
The Court labelled the warrants as "hated writs of assistance." Id. (quoting Stanford
v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965)). No other cases or general histories of the forfeiture
doctrine have linked modem forfeiture to the general warrants. However, the strength of the
Court's displeasure with forfeiture practice is tempered by the fact that all the statements are
arguably in dicta, with only four Justices joining in the full opinion, and two concurring only
in the result. Id. at 1135.
76. Id. at 1134. The Court upheld the use of the defense by non bona fide purchasers
because they were not persuaded that "Congress intended such an inequitable result." Id. at
1135.
77. Id. at 1134. The Government actually asserted two alternative justifications for the
practice of relation back, the statutory language as well as the common law doctrine itself.
The Court held that the statute codified the common law doctrine, and that the common law
doctrine did not allow title to vest until operation of law. Id. at 1136. All six majority Justices concurred on this point of law. Id. at 1134.
78. United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890).
79. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h).
80. 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (delegating to the Attorney General the power to mitigate claims,
as originally assigned under the customs laws at 19 U.S.C. § 1618).
81. Nelson, supra note 4, at 1322 (citing Federal Seizure of Illegal Assets Nets
Government $1.5 Billion Since 1985, U.S. L. WKLY., Feb. 4, 1991).
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forfeited in 1990 was returned to the original owner through the Attorney
General. 2
The procedures established under the Drug Abuse Control Act have
generally favored governmental power over the rights of property owners.
For example, courts have required the government to carry only a minimal
evidentiary burden of probable cause to initiate forfeiture proceedings. 3 In
practice, this merely requires that the government show some reason to
believe the property is being used illegally.84 Probable cause is traditionally
viewed within the criminal law context as a procedural hurdle to the search
for evidence sufficient to apply to the state's case-in-chief;85 within the
forfeiture context, however, the showing of probable cause completely
satisfies the state's required burden. In contrast to the government's minimal
burden, the Act requires property owners prove their "innocence" in caring
for the property86 and show by a preponderance of the evidence that they
have exercised the highest standard of care. 7
This enhancement of the government's police power at the expense of
individual property rights has resulted in a system of adjudication neither
criminal nor civil.8 Rather, the Drug Abuse Control Act has created the
inverse of the criminal model under which individuals are innocent until
proven guilty. 9 The courts' construction of the Act has harmed property
owners in order to further public policy in the war on drugs.
Notwithstanding the onus of the requirements placed on property owners,

82. Id.
83. See United States v. 42450 Hwy. 441, 920 F.2d 900 (1lth Cir. 1991).
84. United States v. $364,960.00 in United States Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir.
1981). See supra note 66 for further discussion of probable cause.
85. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990).
86. See 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1995); United States v. One 1957 Rockwell Aero Commander
680 Aircraft, 671 F.2d 414, 417 (10th Cir. 1982). For further discussion on the owner's proof
of innocence, see supra note 70.
87. Nelson, supra note 4, at 1317 n.31.
88. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965); see also
Schecter, supra note 4, at 1157-72 (discussing the ambiguity of whether forfeiture is criminal
or civil).
89. In the words of one commentator, the claimant must "mount a full-scale offense
against the government in order to reclaim her property." Nelson, supranote 4, at 1321. This
standard creates a burden on the claimant even greater than that of an ordinary civil defendant,
a fact noted by the Department of Justice.
This makes civil forfeiture cases significantly different from other civic [sic] actions.
Once the Government establishes probable cause for forfeiture, as determined by the
judge, the defendant must produce some evidence in defense of the property. If he
does not, the judge must direct a verdict in favor of the Government.
Id. at 1320 (quoting from the MODEL FORFEITURE OF DRUG PROFITS ACT, reprinted in
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DRUG AGENTS' GUIDE TO FORFEITURE OF ASSETS

at A2-A8 (1987 revision)).
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courts generally9" have been reluctant to exercise their equitable powers in
forfeiture proceedings. 9' Likewise, the traditional safeguards available
through the Executive Branch have failed. Prosecutorial discretion to forego
forfeiture proceedings has been discouraged 92 by law enforcement
departments searching for new revenue sources.9 3

In fact, at least one

police department hired additional clerical personnel to search the files of
past police actions for fact patterns that fitted forfeitable profiles. 94 Arguably, practices such as these violate the congressional intent behind the Drug
Abuse Control Act. 95

90. Some circuits, notably the Second and Eleventh, have proven more open to requiring
that the value of the property subject to forfeiture bear some relation to the gravity of the
alleged drug offense. See United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1500 (11 th
Cir. 1992) (stating that "[p]rotection of innocent owners goes beyond the language of section
881" and that the courts must consider "core individual rights"); United States v. 418 57th St.,
922 F.2d 129, 132 (2d. Cir. 1990) (concluding that in overruling a potential forfeiture, "[o]ur
opinion simply reflects these competing concerns [law enforcement and individual rights] with
an eye toward maintaining the intended balance").
91. Courts have viewed the statutory innocent-owner defense as establishing the limits for
considering the equities of individual forfeitures, at least within the Eleventh Circuit. United
States v. 4.14 Acres, 801 F. Supp. 737, 743 (S.D. Ga. 1992) (stating that the forfeiture of a
widow's home due to her daughter's drug trafficking was "unduly harsh" in "light of these
(statutory) purposes," but concluding that "[u]nfortunately, the law dictates this result").
92. See United States v. James Daniel Good Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 492 n.2 (1993)
(referring to a 1990 Justice Department memo in which the Attorney General directs United
States Attorneys to "significantly increase production to reach our budget target" and "increase
forfeiture income during the remaining three months of [fiscal year] 1990").
93. For a discussion of the potential conflicts of interest inherent in prosecutorial
decisions, see United States v. 4880 Dixie Hwy., 612 F. Supp. 1492, 1497 (S.D. Fla. 1985)
(calling for pre-seizure judicial review in all but the most compelling circumstances).
The prosecutor's role in forfeiture proceedings was called into question in the
Pittsburgh Press. See Schneider & Bowman, supra note 41, at Al. Reporters detailed
instances where innocent owners who eventually would have prevailed at trial were offered
"settlements" by prosecutors prior to trial. Id. One claimant, successful at trial, was offered
the immediate release of his plane for $66,000, notwithstanding that the plane had suffered
an estimated $50,000 in damages while in government hands. Id. In return, the prosecutor
offered not to appeal the judgment, thereby allowing the claimant to pursue his livelihood
again. Id. In another example, law enforcement officers stopped two drivers for traffic infractions and seized their cash on suspicion of drug trafficking. Id. After challenging the
seizures, the two drivers had their money returned, less "contribution" amounts retained in lieu
of further proceedings. Id. In response to such practices, a former judge has decried
prosecutors' plea bargain offerings to drop charges against criminal defendants in return for
large property forfeitures. Martin L. Haines, Drug War -America's War of Self-Deception,
N.J. L.J., June 21, 1993, at 20.
94. Schneider & Flaherty, supra note 9, at Al (detailing the Honolulu Police Department's
hiring of a clerk to review the records of the previous five years for potentially forfeitable
properties).
95. There is evidence that the original legislative intent behind the Act supported a more
balanced application, giving more weight to property owners' rights. "Neither Congress nor
the people intended that the Bill of Rights be a fatality in the war on drugs." 4880 Dixie
Hwy., 612 F. Supp. at 1497-98; see Nelson, supra note 4, at 1316 n.25 (quoting S. REP. No.
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In adopting and applying these practices, courts have developed the jurisprudence of forfeiture without regard for the interests of the citizens whose
property has been wrongly seized.96 As currently applied, the forfeiture
doctrine metes out unduly harsh penalties to minimal drug users in contravention of the statute's original intent. 97 Casual drug users, a group that includes a substantial segment of the population,98 are subject to potentially
disproportionate forfeiture fines for their behavior.99 Recently, however, the
equities of forfeiture have begun to incorporate concerns for the innocent.
This evolution can be seen most clearly by tracing several major Supreme
Court decisions.

225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191, 195 (1983), which states that the aim behind the 1978
Amendment authorizing forfeitures of real property was directed at structures used to store
large quantities of drugs as part of a distribution network). Recent Supreme Court decisions
agree that congressional intent is not served by harsh applications of the forfeiture doctrine.
See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1134 (1993).
96. The application of the forfeiture doctrine has been insufficiently sensitive to the
interests of claimants. United States v. James Daniel Good Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
The Court held that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause should apply to claimants
contesting the forfeiture of their real property. Id. at 500.
97. This contention is supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Austin v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). The Court in Austin held that the Eighth Amendment's limit
on "excessive fines" should apply to forfeiture proceedings. Id. at 2812. As stated infra at
note 99, the Austin Court did not suggest how this limitation might be judicially applied. See
Nelson, supra note 4, at 1316.
98. Recent surveys indicate that nearly 13 million Americans are casual drug users.
Mixed News from Drug Front, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 20, 1990, at A2. There are methodological
reasons to assume that even these figures are understated because the statistics reflect only
those living in households that respond honestly to the surveyors. Id. Other studies have
concluded that 63% of Americans born after 1955 have violated narcotics laws. Richard
Grant, Drugs in America: Zero Tolerance, THE INDEPENDENT, June 20, 1993, at A14.
99. Numerous claimants have challenged forfeiture applications as violative of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines with mixed results. While most circuits have
rejected the Eighth Amendment as inapplicable to forfeiture considerations, the Second Circuit
has allowed limited applicability to forfeitures which are "overwhelmingly disproportionate."
United States v. 38 Whaler's Cove Dr., 954 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1992). For a complete
survey of the various circuits' holdings in the area, see United States v. 566 Hendrickson
Blvd., 986 F.2d 990, 998 (6th Cir. 1993).
The Supreme Court's recent ruling in Austin has resolved the disagreement between the
circuits in favor of the Second Circuit's position. Id. The ruling is especially worthy of
mention because the Court denied certiorari following the Second Circuit's original opinion.
113 S. Ct. 2801. The complete impact of the decision, however, is impossible to gauge at this
juncture. The Court provided no specific guidelines for applying a proportionality analysis,
leaving that task to the lower courts for development. Id. at 2812. The only guidance the
Court provided was that "the connection between the property and the offense may be relevant, but our decision today in no way limits the Court of Appeals from considering other
factors in determining whether the forfeiture of Austin's property was excessive." Id. at 2812
n. 15. Presumably, the circuits are free to consider the equities of each case ad hoc until an
appropriate rule emerges.
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Ill.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS -

SUPREME COURT

The first Supreme Court decision that addressed the equities of drug
forfeiture was Calero-Toledo v.Pearson Yacht Company.' Decided prior
to the passage of the current statute, Calero-Toledo involved the application
of a Puerto Rican forfeiture statute.' 0
The Court in Calero-Toledo
established both the framework for the standard of care required of property
02
owners and the parameters of the innocent-owner defense.'
In Calero-Toledo, Puerto Rican police seized a boat used to ship marihuana.10 3 The boat had been leased by Puerto Rican residents who
subsequently were arrested and charged with drug offenses. °4 Two months
after the arrests, police seized the boat and claimed possession under a Puerto
05
Rican statute that allowed for the forfeiture of vessels used to ship drugs.'
Pearson Yacht Company, the owner of the boat, was not given notice and
only learned of the seizure after attempting to repossess the boat for unpaid
rent. 0

The Court upheld the statute as applied. 7 In so doing, three important
elements of modem forfeiture practice were validated. First, the Court expressed approval of forfeiture in general as a punitive measure to deter drug
use. 8 Second, the Court approved the seizure of assets without a pre-seizure hearing.'0 9 Third, dicta in the case suggested what would constitute
a successful innocent-owner defense." 0
The Court characterized the Puerto Rican statute as "further[ing] the

100. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
101. Id. at 664 (seizure was effected under P.R. Laws Ann., Tit. 24 § 2101 et seq.). As
noted in section I of this note, federal forfeiture practice was not common until the 1978
amendments enacted by Congress.
102. Id. at 680-90.
103. Id. at 663.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 665 n.l.
106. Id. at 667.
107. Id. at 690.
108. Id. at 686.
109. Id. at 679.
110. Id. at 689-90. The Court stated that
[I]t would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner.., who proved
not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also
that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use
of his property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that
forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive.
Id. This dicta has served as the model for the statutory innocent-owner defense stated in 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and has been cited repeatedly by courts applying the innocent-owner defense. See, e.g., United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1500 (11 th Cir.
1992); United States v. 7326 Highway 45 N., 965 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992).
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punitive and deterrent purposes" of historical forfeiture doctrines, and stated
approvingly that "[fjorfeiture ... fosters the purposes served by the underlying criminal statutes, both by preventing further illicit use ... and by imposing an economic penalty.""' Allowing the statutes to apply to property
owners who had not violated the law would compel such owners to "exercise
greater care in transferring ownership of their property."" 2
Arguably, the Court's reasoning in Calero-Toledo reflected the
congressional intent behind the original Drug Abuse Control Act and
foreshadowed the rationale behind future amendments to the Act." 3 Though
the Drug Abuse Control Act's exact intent is unclear," 4 RICO, passed by
the same Congress, may illustrate the legislative motivation in concurrently
passing two laws granting law enforcement new powers. 5 Forfeiture
provisions within RICO'1 6 were justified as mounting "an attack ... on the
source of economic power itself."'1 7 This language seems analogous to the
"4economic penalty" referred to in Calero-Toledo."8 The 1984 amendment
to the Drug Abuse Control Act, which declared the proceeds of the narcotics
trade subject to forfeiture," 9 justified the addition by tracking the language
of Calero-Toledo, stating that forfeiture of the proceeds would prevent
"future illicit use" and require owners to exercise "greater care" in transferring property. 20 Thus, Calero-Toledo first enunciated the public policy behind some of the harsh applications of the forfeiture doctrine.
The Supreme Court in Calero-Toledo also took pains to distinguish the
seizure of assets used in narcotics violations from the replevin practices
outlawed in Fuentes v. Shevin.' 2' According to the Court, the pre-seizure
hearings called for in Fuentes were not required in drug seizures for three

111. Calero-Toledo,416 U.S. at 686-87.
112. Id. at 687.
113. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)-(7). For further discussion of these amendments, see supra text
accompanying notes 31-41.
114. The express purpose of the Act was stated as increasing drug research, punishing drug
dealers and encouraging treatment. H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprintedin
1970 U.S. C.C.A.N. 4566; see Schecter, supra note 4, at 1155 n.35 and accompanying text.
Because these three rationales would not seem applicable to the forfeiture provision of the
statute, it is safe to assume that the reasons apply to the rest of the statute.
115. Schecter, supra note 4, at 1155 (citing the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 943 (1970)). The Supreme Court has acknowledged the close
relationship between the RICO statute and the Drug Abuse Control Act for purposes of
interpretation. United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1133 n. 16 (1993).
116. Schecter, supra note 4, at 1155.
117. Id.
118. Calero-Toledo,416 U.S. at 687.
119. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7); see Nelson, supra note 4, at 1325. See supra notes 35 & 95
for further comment on the congressional intent of the amendments.
120. Calero-Toledo,416 U.S. at 686-87.
121. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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reasons: (1) The state controlled the seizure; (2) Strong governmental
interests were at stake in preventing continued illegal use of the property; and
(3) Immediate action was necessary to prevent the boat from being removed
to another jurisdiction. 22 This approval generally
insulated forfeiture from
23
due process attacks for nearly twenty years.
Calero-Toledo also established the general parameters for the innocentowner defense, which Congress added to the Drug Abuse Control Act in
1978, four years after the decision. 24 In dicta, the Court stated that
forfeiture might be inapplicable if the owner proved that he neither
participated in nor was aware of the illegal activity and had done everything
reasonable to prevent the property from being used illegally. 25 Courts
have interpreted this language as requiring an innocent owner to take all "rea-

122. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679. The James Daniel Good decision has further distinguished this line of reasoning from Calero-Toledo. The James Daniel Good Court held that
Calero-Toledo's approval of pre-hearing seizures does not apply to real property because,
unlike yachts, real property is not mobile and cannot be removed from the appropriate court's
jurisdiction. 114 S. Ct. at 500. The additional justifications for pre-hearing seizure given by
the Calero-Toledo Court (i.e., state control of the process and strong interests in preventing
continued illegal use) were not considered, despite Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting claim
that all three reasons were central to Calero-Toledo's holding. Id. at 510. Instead, the Court
found that the government's only legitimate interests at the inception of the forfeiture process
was the prevention of further illegal use of the property. Id. at 503. As such, no pre-seizure
hearing is justified unless the possibility of damage to the property exists. Id.
123. As noted above, the James Daniel Good decision has again made the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment applicable to forfeiture. 114 S.Ct. at 500. In analyzing
forfeiture under the Due Process Clause, the James Daniel Good Court relied upon Matthews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and rejected Fuentes. 114 S.Ct. at 501. Both cases sought
to establish standards for the level of Constitutional due process required in novel situations.
The three factors that the Court used to test the Puerto Rican statute at issue in CaleroToledo were not the same considerations that the Court deemed relevant in Matthews. Instead,
Matthews enunciated a variable due process standard that balanced three factors: the private
interest of the individual affected by state action, the risk of erroneous deprivation under
existing procedures and the government's interest in not assuming the burdens of additional
process. 424 U.S. at 321. For a discussion of the Court's view of the weight of the
government's interest in forfeiture prior to the James Daniel Good decision, see Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989), discussed at infra text
accompanying notes 129-47.
The James Daniel Good Court, focusing on Matthews, found the government's interests
insufficient to warrant prehearing seizure. 114 S.Ct. at 502. At least one lower court has
cited Matthews as allowing a relaxed standard of due process in forfeiture proceedings.
United States v. 4880 S.Dixie Hwy., 612 F. Supp. 1492, 1497 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (using
Matthews' "fluid" due process requirements to approve ex parte hearings).
124. The statutory innocent-owner defense was part of the 1978 amendment to the Drug
Abuse Control Act. Damon Saltzburg, Real Property Forfeitures as a Weapon in the
Government's War on Drugs: A Failure to Protect Innocent Ownership Rights, 72 B.U. L.
REv. 217, 225 (citing Pub. L. No. 95-633, tit. III, § 301, 92 Stat. 3777 (1978) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)).
125. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688-90.
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sonable steps" to prevent his property from being used illegally. 12 6
The governmental interest in securing the proceeds of illicit transactions,
listed as a factor justifying a lessened due process standard in CaleroToledo,'27 was held to be substantial in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States.2 ' The petitioner in Caplin & Drysdale challenged forfeiture
as a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel,'2 9 asserting that the
government's claim on his assets prevented him from retaining the counsel
of his choice.130 He asked the Court to rule that a portion of the forfeitable
assets sufficient to retain his preferred counsel be set aside for that
31
purpose.

1

Justice White, writing for a five-justice majority, rejected the petitioner's
argument.'32 According to the Court, the Sixth Amendment only guarantees the right to adequate representation, not to the counsel of one's
choice. 133 The Court in Caplin & Drysdale also affirmed that forfeiture did
not alter the generally required constitutional balance between the rights of
the accused and the interests of the state.1 34 Most significantly, the Court
described135the government's interest in recovering forfeitable assets as
"strong."'
In contrast, the Court discounted the claimant's interests in
those same assets as being merely a simple possessory interest with no

126. United States v. 3855 S. April St., 797 F. Supp. 933, 937 (M.D. Ala. 1992). Citing
Calero-Toledo as authority, the court ruled that § 881 (a)(6) did not require that a 69-year-old
grandmother with a sixth-grade education swear out complaints because such actions were not
reasonable for a woman in her condition. Id.
This reading has generally been adopted by the Eleventh Circuit's district courts and
is seemingly in contrast to the decisions of other circuits, such as the Second Circuit's requirement that an innocent owner practice the highest standard of care. But cf United States v.
One 1957 Rockwell Aero Commander 680 Aircraft, 671 F.2d 414, 415, 418 (10th Cir. 1982)
(upholding the forfeiture of an aircraft accepted as collateral which the claimant had not taken
possession of but had left in a small hangar from where it was appropriated for a drug run).
This "subjective" standard is arguably more lenient than the Eleventh Circuit's published opinions. See United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1506 (11 th Cir. 1992) (establishing an objective definition of "reasonable efforts" as contacting and cooperating with
police).
127. 416 U.S. at 679.
128. 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
129. The actual statute that the petitioner challenged was 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) (Supp. V
1982), a sister statute of 21 U.S.C. § 881 (Supp. V 1982). Section 853 allows forfeiture of
assets gained through a "continuing criminal enterprise." 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(3). The
forfeiture provisions of the two acts are identical.
130. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 619. The Court granted the government's motion for
a restraining order preventing the defendant from alienating any of his forfeitable assets. This
left him without sufficient resources to retain counsel.
131. Id. at 621.
132. Id. at 634.
133. Id. at 624.
134. Id. at 634.
135. Id. at 631.
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property rights. 13 6 These two characterizations evinced clear bias favoring
governmental interests in judicial determinations of the equities of forfeiture.
The Caplin & DrysdaleCourt's description of the government's stake in
forfeiture included factors beyond simple criminal deterrence. In fact,
137
deterring drug use was not listed among the rationales behind forfeiture.
Financial contributions to law enforcement budgets, according to the Court,
constituted the primary reason to ensure that all recoverable assets were
forfeited. 3 ' The Court noted that the monetary supplement to law eninterest in mainforcement was "substantial," and that the government's
139
discounted."'
be
not
"should
funding
taining such
Total asset recovery was deemed necessary for two other reasons. First,
the government's obligation to return illegally gained property to its rightful
owner requires that these assets be recovered in full."4 Second, full recovery of all forfeitable assets prevents drug offenders from being able to contest
their charges with "high-priced legal talent."' 4' Conceding that the quality
of counsel affects the ability to mount a strong defense against criminal
charges, the Court, nevertheless, approved of total asset forfeiture as
consistent with the aims of the statute. 42 Together, the combination of

136. Id. at 626. The Court analogized the bank accounts that the claimant sought to release
with the cash a bank robber possesses after running from the bank. Although the robber may
possess the money, his possession is not lawful. Id. To validate the comparison, the Court
referred to the relation-back provision of the Act. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 853(c)).
The relation-back doctrine was described as a corollary to what the Court termed the
"substantial taint" theory, which incriminates the property by virtue of its illegal usage. Id.
at 627. This taint theory is, ironically, also referred to in 92 Buena Vista Ave., a case that
severely limited the scope of the relation-back doctrine. 113 S. Ct. at 1134-35. In 92 Buena
Vista Ave., the Court asserted that, even in instances where the relation-back doctrine was
inapplicable, equitable consideration of the "tainted character of the property" would prevent
the assertion of an innocent-owner defense. Id. at 1137.
The doctrine is also part of 21 U.S.C. § 881 and vests the government with ownership
of the forfeitable asset at the moment the asset is used illegally. 21 U.S.C. § 88 1(h). Therefore, the Court in Caplin & Drysdale held the government's interest in the property as already
existing. 491 U.S. at 627. In balancing this interest against the possessory interest of the
"bank robber," the Court found the government's interest predominant. Id. at 631.
137. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 629.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. The Court cited 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A), which awards ownership of the
potentially forfeitable assets to any third party who can assert a superior ownership claim.
Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 629. It is difficult to imagine the application of this provision
to drug trafficking since the dealer's proceeds are derived from drug purchasers, who also
have used those assets to violate the law. Therefore, it would appear that this rationale was
inapplicable to the facts before the Court, that is, the seizure of the assets of a defendant
charged with narcotics laws violations. Nevertheless, the Court again made the analogy to a
bank robbery, with the bank entitled to a return of the funds. Id. at 629-30.
141. Id. at 630.
142. Id. The Court observed that this result reflected the "harsh reality that the quality of
a criminal defendant's representation may frequently turn on his ability to retain the best
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these three by-products of forfeiture cited by the Court resulted in a "strong"
governmental interest that outweighed any interest in "permitting
criminals
43
to use assets adjudged forfeitable to pay for their defense."'
The Court dismissed the petitioner's contention that forfeiture violated
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.'" Absent specifically pleaded
examples of prosecutorial misconduct, the Court ruled the Fifth Amendment
inapplicable in forfeiture jurisprudence. 45 The mere fact that forfeiture
provided an easy
opportunity for abuse was insufficient to merit overturning
146
the doctrine.
Read in combination with Calero-Toledo, Caplin & Drysdale created a
legal environment that favored governmental interests in forfeiture decisions.
Most of the circuit courts followed this philosophy.'4 7 The balance in favor
of governmental interests, however, appears to have shifted towards greater
consideration of claimants' 148interests with the recent Supreme Court decision
of 92 Buena Vista Avenue.

Though the holding of 92 Buena Vista Avenue concerned two procedural
aspects of the forfeiture doctrine, the Court's language suggested a less deferential standard towards governmental interests. 49 Previously, the courts
had ruled that the congressional desire to create a new and powerful weapon
to combat drug abuse necessitated a broad reading of the Drug Abuse Control

counsel money can buy." Id. (quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in result)). Depriving defendants of the best representation was considered to be
one of the congressional aims behind the statute, a motivation the Court termed "unsettling."
Id.
143. Id. at 631.
144. Id. at 634.
145. Id.
146. Id. In another frank statement, the Court described forfeiture provisions as "powerful
weapons in the war on crime ... their impact can be devastating when used unjustly." Id.
According to the decision, the responsibility for preventing such abuse lay at the district court
level. Id. This statement has proven to accurately reflect the practice of the district courts,
at least in the Eleventh Circuit. See United States v. 3855 S. April St., 797 F. Supp. 933, 937
(M.D. Ala. 1992). This is expanded on in supra note 126.
147. Though most of the circuits have adopted a pro-forfeiture stance in their decisions,
the lack of prior Supreme Court decisions interpreting points of law on the subject has led to
substantial variance among the appellate courts, as discussed in supra note 65. In addition,
the Ninth Circuit specifically has been cited by the Justice Department as favoring claimants
in contravention to the law in other circuits. See Nelson, supra note 4, at 1317 n.31.
148. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1126.
149. See id. at 1135. The Court's call for a more narrow construction of forfeiture laws
arguably was already in practice at the district court level; see discussion in supra note 75.
Alabama's Northern District has ruled in at least one decision that the "rule of lenity" is the
proper approach to adjudicating ambiguous fact patterns in quasi-criminal matters such as forfeiture. United States v. 632-636 Ninth Ave., 798 F. Supp. 1540, 1543 (N.D. Ala. 1992). But
cf United States v. 60 Acres in Etowah County, 727 F. Supp. 1414, 1419 (N.D. Ala. 1990)
(characterizing 21 U.S.C. § 881 as a purely civil statute, not to be interpreted with the rule
of lenity similar to a criminal statute).
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Act. 50 92 Buena Vista Avenue departs from this philosophy by limiting
two of the government's procedural advantages in forfeitures and by espousing a concern for the extent of the power that the Act granted law enforce5
ment.1 1
The Court's two procedural rulings in 92 Buena Vista Avenue are quite
significant. First, the Court rescinded the rule limiting the innocent-owner
defense to bona fide purchasers. 15 2 By ending this limitation, the Court has
53
signalled an intent to construe statutes empowering forfeiture narrowly.1
The limitation was not referenced in the original text of the statute and had
been part of prior courts' interpretation of the statute."
Second, the majority in 92 Buena Vista Avenue limited the application
of the relation-back doctrine, a fiction that vested title to the property in the
government at the moment of its illegal use.'
Unlike its ruling regarding
bona fide purchasers, however, the majority had to address the plain meaning
of the statute in reaching its result. 6 The majority's restricted reading of

150. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91513, § 511 (quoting from the report accompanying RICO, justifying forfeiture as a "new approach that will deal ... with the economic base ... which constitute[s] a serious threat to
the economic well-being of the nation").
The courts have often made reference to congressional intent in making broad
interpretations about the Act's scope. See United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 880
(2d Cir. 1990) ("Interpreting the statute [21 U.S.C. § 881] to permit forfeiture of entire parcels
of real property gives effect to this congressional intent to eliminate ambiguities and to attack
the assets that facilitate criminal activity."); see also United States v. 4.14 Acres, 801 F. Supp.
737, 743 (S.D. Ga. 1992) (indicating that the provisions of the statute dictate a "harsh result").
151. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1134-35. For further discussion on the need for
government restraint, see supra notes 75-77.
152. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S Ct. at 1127.
153. Id. at 1133. The Court conceded that the Drug Abuse Control Act "marked an
important expansion of governmental power." Id. After tracing the history of customs and
piracy laws, which only permitted asset forfeiture of items that were stolen or per se illegal
to possess, the Court concluded that modem forfeiture was a departure from traditional
jurisprudence. Id. at 1132-34. Therefore, a narrowing interpretation was held as the appropriate standard of review. Id. at 1134.
154. Id. Justice Kennedy's dissent pointed out the policy considerations behind the former
rule, especially the potential collision with the substantive law of property. Id. at 1143. The
law of property, according to the dissent, did not award any property interest to those who
were not bona fide purchasers. Id. at 1144. Therefore, the innocent-owner defense was inapplicable because non-bona fide purchasers had no "ownership" rights to assert. Id. The
majority (all six Justices concurred on this point of law) ruled that equity dictated against such
a result and maintained that the plain meaning of the statute did not limit the scope of the
defense. Id. at 1135. See supra note 76 for further discussion.
155. See 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1134. See supra text accompanying notes 7779, discussing the relation-back doctrine.
156. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1126 passim. The Court's counterintuitive reading
of the statute prompted Justice Scalia, a noted advocate of strict textualism, to concede in his
concurrence that "there is some textual difficulty with the interpretation I propose .... " Id.
at 1140.
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the relation-back doctrine was significant since it removed two of the
advantages previously enjoyed by the government in forfeiture proceedings.
First, the relation-back doctrine had permitted the government to defeat the
claims of owners who acquired the property subsequent to commission of the
illegal acts giving rise to the forfeiture. 5 7 This is a rare scenario, but it can
affect the ownership interests of equitable owners and security holders.
Second, the relation-back doctrine had accorded the government a superior
property interest to subsequent security holders because the government's
ownership was held to vest prior to the recording of the security interest. 58
In addition to its use as a procedural weapon by the government, the
relation-back doctrine had served as a jurisprudential justification for the
relaxed procedures in forfeiture actions.' 5 9 According to this reasoning, the
government is only recovering property it already owns. 6° By its holding
in 92 Buena Vista Avenue, the Court appeared to reject this line of reasoning.
The Supreme Court further eroded the underpinnings of modern forfeiture
practice in Austin v. United States.' 6' Austin involved the application of
the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause 62 and property forfeitures
under the Drug Abuse Control Act. Following the petitioner's sentencing for
157. See 92 Buena Vista Ave., 738 F. Supp. 854, 860 (D. N.J. 1990), aff'd in part and
remanded in part, 937 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1260 (1992),
overruled by 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
158. 113 S. Ct. at 1136. The Court made no reference to the inequities of this result under
substantive property law. Id. at 1137. Jurisdictions with a "race-notice" recording statute
award a superior property interest to a bona fide purchaser, including security holders, who
record their interest without being put on notice whether any other such interests exist. The
dissent made note of the potential conflict with the law of property entailed by the ruling
without pointing out specific damage to any interests except those of the government. Id. at
1145 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
159. See United States v. Gulfstream W., 710 F. Supp. 792, 796 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (holding
that the statutory application, specifically the relation-back doctrine, allows government
immediate title, even to the extent that inequitable results are produced); United States v.
$84,740.00, 981 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the administrator of the estate cannot
make a claim for assets forfeited by the decedent, as the assets were not part of estate; title
vested on the government at the time of crime, therefore, the decedent did not have title at the
time of death).
160. United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397, 401 (4th Cir. 1982) (decreeing that the Fourth
Amendment did not control forfeiture actions because the United States was merely recovering
its property).
161. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). Even though Austin was only decided recently and lacks
specificity, that does not lessen its significance. Given the lack of case law applying to its
holding, Austin is difficult to interpret. The Court elected to leave the eventual development
of its major points to the lower courts. Id. at passim. Therefore, the principal discussion of
Austin is rather brief, with the majority of its treatment in the particular endnotes describing
the areas of forfeiture practice that Austin will most likely impact. Id. at 2801.
Within the limited forfeiture context, the case clearly qualifies as a landmark decision.
As such, this note will attempt to lay out the major aspects of the decision that will affect the
normative analysis of the forfeiture doctrine.
162. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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narcotics law violations, the United States Attorney sought forfeiture of the
petitioner's trailer and auto body shop. 63 State authorities had arrested the
petitioner, Austin, after he had sold two grams of cocaine at his shop."
In opposing the forfeiture, Austin challenged the doctrine's application
to him as a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
excessive fines. 165 Both the district court and the Eighth Circuit refused to
recognize the applicability of a constitutional argument.' 66 Although the
Eighth Circuit voiced its reluctance to side with the government because its
exaction did not fit the crime, 167 the court indicated that both the case law
Supreme Court offered little support for applying
from other circuits and the
68
Amendment.
the Eighth
On certiorari review,169 the Supreme Court in Austin held that forfeiture
was clearly punitive, and therefore, subject to constitutional limitations. 7 °
In reaching its holding, the Court traced the history of the forfeiture doctrine,
Three historical obincluding its importation into United States law.'
servations led the Court to conclude that modem forfeiture clearly should be
considered punishment.'
First, common-law forfeiture reached the United States as a combination
of the deodand and the practice of seizing the assets of convicted felons.'73
Both traditions included a "punitive aspect."' 74 Second, earlier United
States statutory schemes had included the forfeiture of goods as the penalty
for violations.7 7 Third, the term forfeiture, in its early application in the
163. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803.
164. Id.
165. Id. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
166. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803.
167. Id. (citing United States v. One Parcel of Property, 964 F.2d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 1992)).
The exact quote, which was included in Justice Blackmun's opinion, was that the government
was "exacting too high a penalty in relation to the offense committed." Id. (quoting 964 F.2d
at 817).
168. Id. The Eighth Circuit's finding that proportionality was not a valid consideration in
adjudicating forfeitures was premised upon the Calero-Toledo allowance of the forfeiture of
the property of innocent owners. Id. As a result, it hardly seemed appropriate for the lower
court to apply a proportionality review directed at the forfeiture of property of convicted
felons. Id. For additional discussion regarding the relationship between the Eighth
Amendment and forfeiture prior to the Austin decision, see infra note 232.
169. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804.
170. Id. at 2808. "Our cases also have recognized that statutory in rem forfeiture imposes
punishment." Id.
171. Id. at 2804-07.
172. Id. at 2810 ("[T]his Court ...consistently has recognized that forfeiture serves, at
least in part, to punish the owner.").
173. Id. at 2806.
174. Id. at 2807.
175. Id. The Court referenced earlier customs, tax and admiralty laws that specifically set
the penalty for noncompliance as forfeiture of the relevant goods. Id. See supra notes 12 &
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United States, was used interchangeably with the word fine. 176 This history
compelled the Court to conclude that modem forfeiture under the Drug
77
Abuse Control Act was also punitive unless practice indicated otherwise.'
Once forfeiture was placed in historical perspective, the Court examined
its modem practice.
Two factors led the Court to declare that statutory
forfeiture under the Drug Abuse Control Act continued to emphasize the
punitive aspects of the practice. First, the decision placed great credence in
179
congressional intent, as expressed in the legislative history of the Act.
Second, the Act's limited application to property involved in narcotics felonies, coupled with the exemption for the property of innocent owners,
prompted the Court to label modem forfeiture a "payment to a sovereign as
80
punishment for some offense."'
The Austin Court rejected the government's argument that forfeiture did
not constitute punishment because it served remedial purposes.' 8 ' Specifically, the government urged against viewing forfeiture as punitive in the
criminal sense.1 12 Rather, it argued that the transfer of ownership in the
seized property serves two remedial purposes: (1) removing dangerous
"instruments" from the public and (2) compensating the government for the
costs of drug enforcement efforts.8 3 Neither argument was accepted by the
4
Court.

I

20 for additional discussion of history.
176. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2808.
177. Id. at 2810 ("We find nothing in these provisions [21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)]
or their legislative history to contradict the historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment.").
178. Id. at 2811-12.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2812 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco, 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989)).
181. Id. at 2810-11. The Court also discounted the value of earlier lines of cases that justified forfeiture on other grounds. The view that forfeiture proceedings were undeserving of
close constitutional scrutiny because they were in rem actions was dismissed as fictitious. Id.
at 2808 n.8. In rem seizures, the Court stated, are merely jurisdictional tools and do not
address the equities of the action. Id.
The Court refused to justify relaxed procedural safeguards on the basis of forfeiture's
civil nature. Id. at 2806 n.6. Also, earlier case law that placed minor civil fines outside of
the criminal law context was not dispositive in determining whether the Eighth Amendment
applied to forfeiture. Id.
182. Id. at 2811.
183. Id.
184. Id. The government also asserted that the proceeds from forfeited property are necessary to compensate for societal problems such as "urban blight, drug addiction, and other
health concerns resulting from the drug trade," in addition to defraying the costs of direct drug
enforcement. Id. (quoting from the Brief for the United States at 25, 32).
According to information from the Justice Department, forfeited assets are generally
distributed back to the law enforcement agencies which have assisted in the seizure. Nelson,
supra note 4, at 1322 (citing 52 Fed. Reg. 46,885 (1987)). Funds that are not distributed are
deposited into the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Fund. Id. These funds are then
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The Court explained that it had previously rejected an attempt to extend
the dangerous instrument rationale beyond the contraband itself."5 In a
prior opinion, the Court reasoned that property otherwise legal, such as an
automobile, does not become contraband by virtue of illegal use. is6 Consequently, the Court viewed the seizure of automobiles, cash and other goods
as a punitive exercise not a remedial one.8 7 Based on this reasoning, the
Austin Court similarly rejected the characterization of the petitioner's
88
property as a dangerous instrument.1
The Court also rejected the government's argument that seizure of
89
Austin's property constituted compensation for drug enforcement efforts.
Although the government's ability to recover the funds expended to enforce
narcotics laws may be partially remedial, the Court reasoned that the gross
disparity between the value of the property confiscated and the cost of enforcement indicates that the seizure is also punitive. 90 Accordingly, practices such as forfeiture that have both remedial and deterrent effects are
properly viewed as punishment.' 9' Therefore, the Court decided that forfeiture actions fall within the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive
Fines Clause. 92
Unfortunately, the Court gave no guidance in applying the Eighth
Amendment to asset forfeitures.'93 Consequently, it is unclear how Austin
will be applied.' 9' Nevertheless, the Court's language'95 in reference to

transferred for various other law enforcement uses and forfeiture-related expenses, with the
remainder going to the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Id. at 1323 (quoting from the OFFICE OF
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, BUDGET
SUMMARY 63 n.l (1990)).
185. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811.
186. Id. The Court cited to its decision in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380
U.S. 693, 699 (1965), where it distinguished the forfeiture of an automobile used to transport
illegal liquor from items which are illegal per se, labelling the automobile "derivative
contraband." Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811. See infra note 225 for discussion on the degree of
connection between property and crime.
187. Austin, 13 S. Ct. at 2811.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2812.
193. Id. "Prudence dictates that we allow the lower courts to consider the question in the
first instance." Id.
194. The test adopted by the Second Circuit in Whaler's Cove, discussed in supra note 99,
held that forfeitures "grossly disproportionate" to the value of the drugs in question raise a rebuttable presumption that the forfeiture is punitive and not civil. United States v. 38 Whaler's
Cove Dr., 954 F.2d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1992). This presumption can be overcome if the government can show that its forfeiture gains are related to the costs of the investigation and/or the
harm caused to society by the illegal behavior. Id. The Second Circuit's actual application
of the test was distorted by the government's concession that its only legitimate goal in
pursuing forfeiture was as compensation for its costs. Id. Thus, the court held as a matter
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modem forfeiture practice and to the history of the forfeiture doctrine 19 6
signals a substantive retreat from earlier judicial approval of forfeiture.
IV. JUDICIAL DECISIONS -

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

The Eleventh Circuit's decisions have generally reflected greater sympathy for claimants' interests than other circuits. 97 Its standards also have
departed from the norm in various procedural areas.19 8 In addition, the district courts within this circuit have strongly checked police zealousness,
expressing displeasure with police procedure in published opinions.' 99

of law that the 300:1 ratio between the value of the drugs and the value of the property sought
to be forfeited was grossly disproportionate. Id. at 37.
Since the Whaler's Cove decision generated the conflict resolved in Austin, it is
reasonable to infer that the Second Circuit's test will be persuasive in other courts' formulations of the Austin standard.
The Fourth Circuit also has attempted to formulate a more specific test, similar to the
Austin test, consisting of the following three factors: (1) the nexus between the offense and
the property, and the extent of the property's role in the offense, (2) the role and culpability
of the owner, and (3) the possibility of separating the offending property from the remainder.
United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1994).
195. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812. The Court's reference to the "dramatic" variance between
the value of the property forfeited and the social costs of the crime indicates that the Justices
may have been shocked by forfeiture in practice. Considering negative references in 92 Buena
Vista Ave., discussed at supra notes 75-77, and James Daniel Good, discussed in supra text
accompanying note 46, along with the Austin Court's reference, it appears that forfeiture is
strongly disfavored by the Court at this time.
196. The historical references to the origins of forfeiture, discussed in both Austin and 92
Buena Vista Ave., differ from those of most commentators. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812-15; 92
Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1135. See supra notes 2 & 75 for further discussion of the
early history of forfeiture practice. The Court's characterizations of the historical predecessors
of the practice in these decisions have cast forfeiture in a harsh light. This emphasis led Justice Kennedy to remark, "[I]t
[the majority's history] recites a consistent rationale of personal
punishment that neither the cases nor other narratives of the common law suggest." Austin,
113 S.Ct. at 2815 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
197. Lois A. Woodard, Attention Trustees: Is Real Property in the Corpus Secure from
Civil ForfeitureUnder 21 U.S.C. § 881, 56 ALA. LAW. 83 (1995); see also Robert M. Sondak,
The Tide Is Turning: Civil ForfeitureIs Becoming More Accommodating to Innocent Owners
and Innocent Mortgagees, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 175 (Spring 1994).
198. United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1498, 1501 (11 th Cir. 1992).
See infra text accompanying notes 214-17 for a discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's standards.
Most circuits allow more leniency in hearsay testimony presented at forfeiture trials. Nelson,
supra note 4, at 1319.
199. Perhaps the most blatant example of judicial displeasure with law enforcement is
expressed in United States v. 110 Collier Dr., Albertaville, Ala., 793 F. Supp. 1048, 1052
(N.D. Ala. 1992), where the court stated: "The United States has visited an injustice on Julie
Moon [the claimant] . . . . The Court shares some of the blame for this travesty of justice ...
[as] [i]t [the Court] was misled by ...affidavits of the state law enforcement officials whose
agencies stand to gain financially as a result of the forfeiture." In United States v. 632-636
Ninth Ave., the court stated, "More and more courts are voicing frustration at what appears
to be overreaching by the United States in the drug war, particularly in forfeiture cases where
law enforcement agencies have a 'built-in' conflict-of-interest because they share in the
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The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. 1012 Germantown
Road reflects a judicial attempt to balance out the procedural advantages
afforded to the government in forfeiture proceedings.2tu 1012 Germantown
Road involved the forfeiture of a convenience store located in a known drugtrafficking area.2 ' A combined federal-local task force 202 targeted the
convenience store for investigation based on tips from confidential sources. 20 3 The claimant, Roberto Chang, conceded that he was aware of drug
trade on the lot by his store. 204 Chang asserted the innocent-owner defense
by providing evidence that he did not consent to the lot's use by drug dealers. 20 5 Witnesses corroborated that he had repeatedly called police to
remove the dealers. 0 6 He also had placed "No Loitering" signs, installed
security devices, paved the parking lot and removed the public phones used
by dealers outside the buildings. 20 7 Notwithstanding this evidence, the jury
answered "no" to a special interrogatory asking whether Chang had taken all
reasonable steps to prevent such use.20 8

product of the seizure." 798 F. Supp. 1540, 1551 (N.D. Ala. 1992).
In addition, from a judge who's obviously a William F. Buckley fan,
[T]his court, while attempting to maintain its ataraxia, is flummoxed by a governmental jihad so intense that the prosecution occasionally fails to do its
homework, apparently believing that the courts will hand out encomiums to those
who are fighting the battle against drugs, no matter how heavy their hands or how
thin their evidence. The 'penumbrella' [sic] of drug enforcement is simply not broad
enough, with all its possible emanations, to cover the taking of private property in
the face of the uncontradicted testimony of an innocent owner.
United States v. Sonny Cook Motors, 819 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (N.D. Ala. 1993).
Finally, at least one court has resorted to humor as a means of critiquing governmental
abuses. In addressing the unjustified seizure of the Manatee Resort, the court noted the
government's heavy-handed management of the resort during the pendency of litigation and
the resultant damage to the business, by stating: "The government ... repeatedly made much
of the fact that the Resort was being managed by a former Resort employee. This reminded
the Court of the ancient English practice of hanging the nobility with a silk rope." United
States v. 4880 S.Dixie Hwy., 612 F. Supp. 1492, 1494 n.3. (S.D. Fla. 1985).
200. 963 F.2d 1496 (11th Cir. 1992).
201. Id. at 1498.
202. Id. The task force was formed at the request of local agencies. Id. Though the facts
indicate that the FBI was called in to provide additional resources, it is possible that the local
authorities were motivated by the potential access to the relaxed federal forfeiture practices.
Id. Federal criminal procedure is followed if the investigation and seizure is "adopted" by the
United States Attorney after the participation of federal agencies. 19 U.S.C. § 1619 (1988).
For a discussion of "adoption," see supra note 62. The fact that Chang's claim was controlled
by the Drug Abuse Control Act indicates that the United States Attorney adopted the case.
203. See supra note 68 stating that claimants like Chang rarely have access to the identity
of the confidential informants who point police to them.
204. 1012 Germantown Rd, 963 F.2d at 1498.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1498-99.
208. Id. at 1499.
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The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the decision,2 9 assigning
two errors to the district judge. First, the trial judge wrongly denied the
claimant's motion to bifurcate the determination of probable cause and the
consideration of Chang's innocent-owner defense. 210 As stated in the Drug
Abuse Control Act, 21' the government initially has the burden of showing
probable cause that the property is connected to illegal activity.21 2 Deteris considered a matter of law and is not within
mination of probable cause
213
the province of the jury.
Second, the trial judge erred in allowing the government to present its
case within the presence of the jury.214 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that this
decision was a reversible error because, in contravention to the Act, the jury
was allowed to hear evidence irrelevant to the merits of Chang's innocentowner defense. 215 Hearsay evidence 2 6 also reached the jury when the
presented witnesses who described drug purchases on Chang's
government
2 17
property.
Balancing competing policy considerations, the Eleventh Circuit labelled
the hearsay evidence prejudicial and inadmissable. 2" This balancing effort
also led the court to address the issue of the proper standard for determining
"consent" as expressed in the innocent-owner defense. Because the trial
judge did not define "consent" within the context of the defense,2 19 the
Eleventh Circuit Court ruled that the jury instructions on consent were a
prejudicial error.220 Nevertheless, the court affirmed the general definition
of the innocent-owner defense given the jury, specifically that the claimant
had no actual knowledge of the illicit use and that he did "everything that
could be reasonably expected to do to prevent the subject property from

209. Id. at 1497-98.
210. Id. at 1501. Given the shifting burdens in forfeiture trials, it was illogical to combine
the two aspects of Chang's adjudication. Unless and until probable cause was found, there
was no need for a jury to determine the merits of Chang's defense. The trial judge felt
otherwise, stating that a separate trial on the innocent-owner defense would require Chang to
"disprove something not at issue." Id.
211. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(1).
212. Id. See supra note 62 for a discussion of probable cause.
213. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d at 1497.

214. Id. at 1501.
215. Id.
216. Id. Hearsay evidence is allowed under the Drug Abuse Control Act to establish
probable cause, but not to decide the truth of an innocent-owner defense. Id.
217. Id. at 1498.
218. Id. The court quoted a previous Eleventh Circuit decision which found "two
interrelated aims" of Congress: "to punish criminals while ensuring that innocent persons are
not penalized for their unwitting association with wrongdoers." United States v. 15621 S.W.
209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1513 (11th Cir. 1990).
219. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d at 1504.

220. Id. at 1503.
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being used to commit, or to facilitate the commission of violation of the drug
'
laws."221
The court's emphasis on reasonableness and procedural safeguards reflects a consideration for claimants' interests. This type of consideration is
a recurrent theme in the 1012 Germantown Road decision and the Eleventh
Circuit in general. The language of the decision articulated this normative
emphasis.
We are not unsympathetic to the government's strong desire to
eradicate drug trafficking; we recognize that illegal drugs pose a
tremendous threat to the integrity of our system of government. We
must not forget, however, that at the core of this system lies the
Constitution, with its guarantees of individuals' rights. We cannot
permit222these rights to become fatalities of the government's war on
drugs.
The Eleventh Circuit's attempt to resolve the tension between the Constitution and congressional intent in determining which property merits forfeiture is well illustrated in United States v. 42450 Highway 441.223 42450
Highway 441 involved the forfeiture of land used as a landing strip for illicit
narcotic deliveries and an adjoining house.224 The court approved the
forfeiture of the house despite the lack of evidence that narcotics delivered
via the landing strip ended up there. 225 The court concluded that the gov221. Id. at 1505. See supra note 71 for a discussion of the innocent-owner defense.
222. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d at 1500.
223. 920 F.2d 900 (11th Cir. 1991). As indicated in section I of this note, real property
is subject to forfeit under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) if it is "used, or intended to be used, in any
manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission" of an illegal drug transaction. Id.
at 901. The practical interpretation of this language is the principal subject matter of 42450
Hwy. 441.
224. Id. at 901.
225. Id. "[T]he presence or intended presence of drugs is not a prerequisite to forfeiture
.... " Id. at 903. The Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in 42450 Hwy. 441 illustrates the unique
function of the forfeiture doctrine within United States' law. Contraband, as stated in section
II of this note, is commonly seized under a simple rationale that any item whose very possession is deemed sufficiently dangerous to the public welfare to merit being outlawed should
be removed from circulation. See id. at 902. Seizing contraband obviously requires that the
illicit item be present.
In contrast, property seized under the Drug Abuse Control Act is not illegal per se. 21
U.S.C. § 802 (1994). The real property seized in 42450 Hwy. 441 was common farmland.
920 F.2d at 901. However, this farmland is viewed as "guilty" because it harmed the public
in the tradition of the deodand. Id. at 903. Therefore, the Supreme Court has labelled such
property "derivative contraband." Nelson, supra note 4, at 1313 n.8 (quoting One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965)).
In addition, as 42450 Hwy. 441 illustrates, the property seized need not contain illegal
drugs at the time of seizure. 920 F.2d at 903. As long as the government can demonstrate
probable cause to believe that the property has or will be used to facilitate a drug transaction,
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emiment had demonstrated sufficient evidence 226 tying the house to past
illicit use through specific facts22 7 showing that the house was used in planthe property is subject to forfeit. See id. at 902.
The seizure of large expanses of real property used for remote drug exchanges, like the
property in 42450 Hwy. 441, is especially ironic. After seizing contraband, the government
routinely destroys the property so that it can cause no further harm. Austin v. United States,
113 S. Ct., 2801, 2811 (1993) ("[W]e have recognized that the forfeiture of contraband itself
may be characterized as remedial because it removes dangerous or illegal items from
society.") (citations omitted); see Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687
(1974) ("[F]orfeiture of conveyances that have been used - and may be used again - in
violation of the narcotics laws fosters the purposes served by the underlying criminal statutes,
both by preventing further illicit use and by imposing an economic penalty .... "). There is
no guarantee that property forfeited will not be used illicitly in the future, especially since it
is often ideally suited for such usage.
Consider the speedboats favored by drug dealers. While law enforcement's conversion
of some speedboats to lawful usage is well documented, other speedboats are auctioned back
to the public. It is possible that items such as speedboats, which are of limited practical use,
will again be used illegally. In fact, economic theory would predict just such a result since
goods are supposed to find their most lucrative function. Similarly, large tracts of property
secluded enough to serve as illegal landing strips could again serve such a usage following
sale at auction.
226. The circuits are not in accord over the degree of connection between the property and
the crime that the government must prove to effect the forfeiture of real property. See supra
note 65 for a discussion of the circuits' different standards. The Eleventh Circuit especially
reflects this uncertainty, as it has repeatedly refrained from adopting either the "substantial
connection" test or the "more than incidental or fortuitous connection" test. 42450 Hwy. 441,
920 F.2d at 902. Generally, the district courts within the Eleventh Circuit have adopted the
"substantial connection" test. Id. The court here avoided the issue by holding that the
evidence was sufficient under either test. Id.
As the court indicated, however, the Eleventh Circuit has adopted the substantial
connection test for forfeitures involving both vehicles, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), and proceeds
of drug transactions, commonly cash, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). This inconsistency has the
potential for seemingly anomalous outcomes. Within the Eleventh Circuit, it is possible that
the same evidence regarding a drug transaction may be sufficient to forfeit the home and real
property it sits on, but neither the car sitting in the garage nor the large quantity of cash in
the possession of the alleged dealer. No cases considering these hypothetical facts have yet
been decided, but the potential exists for such a result.
227. The Eleventh Circuit has consistently required the showing of particularized facts in
establishing probable cause. United States v. $4,255,000.00 in United States Currency, 762
F.2d 895, 903 (11th Cir. 1985) (listing nine separate findings that support probable cause).
The quantity of evidence required to seize property should be sufficient to justify an arrest
warrant for a person. United States v. Valdes, 876 F.2d 1554, 1558 (11 th Cir. 1989) (finding
that "[a] seizure of property under 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(4) is essentially the same as the arrest
of a person"). Given sufficient quantity, such evidence can be circumstantial. United States
v. $364,960.00 in United States Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1985). Decisions
of the former Fifth Circuit are binding within the Eleventh Circuit. $4,255,000.00 in United
States Currency, 762 F.2d at 903. Common experience, tempered by common sense, may be
considered by the court in making a probable cause determination. Id. at 904 (taking judicial
notice that the claimant frequently travelled in and out of Miami, a known drug smuggling
center). As in the instant case, no one item of evidence need be dispositive; the evidence is
tested for sufficiency under a totality of the circumstances standard. Id. at 903. The weighing
of the facts and the subsequent determination of probable cause within the Eleventh Circuit
is a matter of law. Id. at 903 n.17.
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ning and facilitating the crime.228
In contrast to the Eleventh Circuit Court's position, the district court that
first reviewed the facts concluded that they did not sufficiently establish
probable cause, and thus, rejected the government's claim to the house.229
Although the district court was eventually overruled by the Eleventh Circuit
Court on this point, the lower court's decision to limit the extent of property
forfeited demonstrates the sympathy in this circuit for the interests of claimants. Typically, the government receives whatever interest the former owner
had at the time of the illegal act.23 ° Other circuits, notably the First and
Ninth, have allowed forfeiture of complete parcels of real property without
regard to which tracts were used illegally.23' Therefore, the district court
in 42450 Highway 441 appears to have injected proportionality considerations
into its decision.232

228. 42450 Hwy. 441, 920 F.2d at 901. The house was the site of three meetings between
the conspirators. Id.
229. Id. The government sought forfeiture of five contiguous parcels of property owned
by the claimant. Id. at 901 n. 1. The district court approved the forfeiture of the property used
as a landing strip, but declared the remainder of the property separable and not subject to forfeiture. Id. Although the facts suggest the government argued that the remainder of the
property was to be used to store the drugs, the court rejected the government's position for
lack of evidence. Id. at 901 n.1, 903. Only the district court's decision rejecting forfeiture
of the home was appealed. Id. at 901 n. 1.
230. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (describing the forfeitable interest as "[a]ll real property,
including any right, title, and interest . . . in the whole of any lot or tract...").
231. See United States v. Plat 20, Lot 17, 960 F.2d 200, 207 n.6 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting
"we are constrained to observe that most other circuits, like this one, have refused to subject
Section 881 (a)(7) forfeitures to proportionality analysis"); see also United States v. Littlefield,
821 F.2d 1365, 1367 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that "Congress plainly provided for forfeiture
of property even where only a portion of it was used for prohibited purposes"). See supra
note 99 indicating that the Second Circuit has adopted a limited proportionality test in
Whaler's Cove. The circuits' disagreement on this point has been resolved by the Supreme
Court's recent ruling in Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2801, which employed an Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis to limit forfeiture. Id. at 2804.
232. An Eleventh Circuit district court finally addressed the issue squarely in United States
v. All Tract 686.64 Acres of Property, 820 F. Supp. 1433 (M.D. Ga. 1993). The All Tract
court elected to join the Sixth and Fourth Circuits in holding that the property subject to
forfeit was to be determined by the instrument creating the interest in the property, as originally decided in United States v. Reynolds, 856 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1988).
This test is titled "the property identification rule." As applied in All Tract, the test
served to limit the amount of property subject to forfeiture. Id. at passim. However, the
property identification test usually serves to increase the amount of property forfeited. In the
Reynolds case, the claimant forfeited a thirty-acre parcel, only a small portion of which was
used illegally, because the lease defined the complete parcel as one tract. All Tract, 820 F.
Supp. at 1443.
In this regard, All Tract's adoption of the test served it well in the case before it, but
is a departure from the reasoning of 42450 Hwy. 441 and other Eleventh Circuit district
decisions. See also United States v. Sonny Cook Motors, 819 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (N.D. Ala.
1993) ("[I]t [the Court] would draw a line between the forfeiture of contiguous parcels that
can easily be distinguished .... ). The adoption of the property identification test has not
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42450 Highway 441 is also a significant opinion because of the Eleventh
Circuit's application of specific facts to clarify the substantial connection
standard. Although the Eleventh Circuit deemed the house in 42450
Highway 441 forfeited because it was used as a regular meeting place in promoting the conspiracy, the court distinguished these regular meetings from
a scenario where there was only isolated use of a phone located on property
to set up a transaction.2 33 In contrasting these two fact patterns, the court
established a brighter line for resolving whether to forfeit property used by
dealers for communication purposes. The court's distinction appears to
accomplish the purposes of the Drug Abuse Control Act, yet at the same time
weighing the interests of claimants.234 Like the opinion in 1012 Germantown Road, 42450 Highway 441 reflects the Eleventh Circuit's attempt to
achieve balance between the intent of the statute and the interests of claimants.
V.

NORMATIVE ANALYSIS

As the case law indicates, the jurisprudence of forfeiture has taken many
twists. The judiciary's support for the doctrine's application has varied over
time, as expressed in the opinions interpreting the Drug Abuse Control Act.
In this regard, forfeiture represents an excellent topic for normative study.
The articulation of public policy, as announced from the bench, is a model
of judicially-constructed policy choices.
These choices are especially apparent when analyzing the evolution of the
innocent-owner defense in which judges have tried to effectuate congressional
intent by balancing23 the property interests of innocent claimants236
against the public's need for additional weapons to prevent the evils of drug

been considered at the appellate level of the Eleventh Circuit. All Tract was decided on April
27, 1993.
It is worth noting that the Austin decision may alter the determination of the amount
of property subject to forfeiture in similar fact situations, discussed in supra text accompanying notes 161-94. The consideration of the value of the property in relation to the harm
of the crime committed is one of the factors the Court deemed as relevant. Austin, 113 S. Ct.
at 2811 n.15. This somewhat mathematical approach is a departure from the legalistic
property identification test.
233. 920 F.2d at 903.
234. The exact parameters of this line were tested in United States v. 3097 SW 111th Ave.,
921 F.2d 1551 (lth Cir. 1991). The case determined the forfeitability of a residential
property used to make a single phone call to the drug buyer and a single drug sale in the outer
driveway of the residence. Id. at 1552-53. The court found the connection of the property
to the crime sufficiently substantial to merit forfeiture. Id. at 1557.
235. See United States v. 418 57th St., 922 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1990).
236. Claimants are termed "innocent" because all forfeiture actions are in rem proceedings
in which the property is deemed "guilty." See supra note 54 for further discussion of
forfeiture actions as in rem proceedings.
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abuse. As indicated in the Calero-Toledo discussion, the Supreme Court at
one time took a narrow view of the interests of owners who used their
property illegally.237 Pearson Yacht Leasing, the company whose boat was
forfeited due to the actions of the boat's lessors, received no sympathy from
the Calero-ToledoCourt because "no. . . proof [was] offered that the company did all that it reasonably could to avoid having its property put to an
illegal use. 238 Seizing the assets of those "innocent of any wrongdoing"
was considered sound policy by the Court since "confiscation may have the
desirable effect of inducing them to exercise greater care in transferring
possession of their property. 2 39 According to the Calero-Toledo Court's
interpretation, the original act viewed innocent owners as necessary casualties
in the war on drugs. 2' The interests of claimants were obviously not of
great concern to the Calero-Toledo Court.
Within the next eighteen years, the Court gradually shifted its emphasis.
This shift is apparent in cases such as 92 Buena Vista Avenue,24 in which
the Court ruled in favor of a claimant who had received $240,000 in liquid
assets from a drug dealer with whom she had had a six-year "intimate"
relationship.242 In addressing the claimant's interest despite the indelicate
factual situation, the Court reversed Calero-Toledo's policy basis.243
The Court's reasoning in 92 Buena Vista Avenue was based on its
reading of the 1988 amendment to the Act, which it interpreted as evidence
of congressional intent to give more consideration to the interests of
owners. 2" The amendment explicitly prevents the forfeiture of any property that was used illegally without the owner's "knowledge, consent or
willful blindness. 245 While the Calero-Toledo Court begrudgingly allowed
the forfeiture of a rented boat due to the criminal behavior of the renters, 46
the 92 Buena Vista Avenue Court ruled that new law prohibited such a forfei-

237. 416 U.S. at 690.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 687-88.
240. Id. at 686 n.25. The Court indicated that the Puerto Rican statute being construed was
modeled after the Drug Abuse Control Act. Id. The Court noted that the statute "further[s]
the punitive and deterrent purposes that have been found sufficient to uphold, against constitutional challenge, the application ... to the property of innocents. Forfeiture of conveyances that have been used .. . in violation of the narcotics laws fosters the[se] purposes . ..."
Id.; see also United States v. 40 Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that
excess recovery in forfeiture is justified due to the societal costs of drug abuse).
241. 113 S. Ct. at 1126.
242. Id. at 1130.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1137 n.23 (stating "the amendment presumably was enacted to protect lessors
like the owner whose yacht was forfeited...").
245. Id. (quoting § 6075(3)(C), 102 Stat. at 4034).
246. 416 U.S. at 688.
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ture.247 Preventing such forfeitures ensured that the Act continued to serve
"legitimate purposes" and was not "unduly oppressive.""24
This policy evolution, purportedly linked to shifting congressional intent,
is representative of the judiciary's role in voicing the ethical norms of society. As indicated earlier, there is evidence of a shift in society's attitude
toward forfeiture laws.249 Through decisions such as 92 Buena Vista Avenue and Austin, as well as numerous opinions from the district courts in the
Eleventh Circuit,25 the courts have again served as the vehicle for expressing predominant societal norms.25'
The judiciary's treatment of forfeiture is especially relevant because the
right to own property and the courts' protection of that right occupy a
hallowed place in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. Indeed, a recent advocacy
group opposing forfeiture has named itself FEAR, an acronym for Forfeiture
Endangers American Rights. The concept of property rights is enshrined in
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, and some courts have
suggested that the English abuse of property rights triggered the Revolutionary War.252 United States citizens have traditionally viewed the right to be
free from unjust property seizures as integral to their social contract with
government. Consequently, any normative analysis must correlate the law's
application with the relevant views towards property generally.
In Children of Darkness, Children of Light,253 Reinhold Niebuhr considers the impact of society's perceptions of the role of property in forming
common societal norms. Niebuhr contrasts the view of property ownership
as an inalienable right flowing from the natural law with the Marxist view

247. 113 S. Ct. at 1136 n.23.
248. Id. at 1137 (quoting Calero-Toledo,416 U.S. at 680-86, in its concern about the potential abuse of forfeiture without a well-developed, innocent-owner defense from Congress).
249. See John Enders, Opposition Growing to Drug ForfeitureLaws, GAINESVILLE [FLA.]
SuN, Feb. 28, 1993, at G 1 (indicating that there is a "wave of opposition to the law [forfeiture
laws] that appears to be sweeping the nation"). Former Deputy Attorney General George
Terwillegar suggested official acknowledgement of the doctrine's growing unpopularity when

he said, "No government program can long endure, much less thrive, without public confidence and support." Id. See supra notes 40-46 for a discussion detailing media coverage of
police abuses and the advent of congressional hearings on the forfeiture laws.
250. See supra note 199 for opinions from district courts.
251. Whether this is the appropriate role for the judiciary has served as fodder for
innumerable jurisprudential debates. See Richard Hiers, Normative and Ostensibly NormNeutral Conventions in ContemporaryJudicialDiscourse, 14 LEGAL STuD.F. 107, 108 (1990)

(indicating that judicial articulations of normative values are widespread, if not acknowledged).
252. Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745, 748 (9th Cir. 1957) (decrying the hated
"writs of assistance" as leading to the colonists' discontent). The 92 Buena Vista Ave. Court,
as discussed in supra note 75, made the same observation, without linking the Revolution
directly to the writs' use.
253. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, CHILDREN OF DARKNESS, CHILDREN OF LIGHT 86-118 (1944).
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that ownership is inherently corrupting." 4 Much of modem thought in the
United States embraces the natural law thesis, and the twentieth-century
conflict with Marxism reinforced this standard. 255 Arguably the natural law
viewpoint still occupies a preeminent place in political thought. Conservative
commentators frequently oppose "excessive taxation" as penalizing the
amassing of property, and thus, being contrary to "American values. 256
Ironically, the remedial aspect of the Drug Abuse Control Act used in
justifying modem forfeiture257 is akin to the Marxist view of property as
a source of evil. 5 8 The Austin Court ultimately rejected this aspect,
quoting an earlier Court decision stating that "[t]here is nothing even remotely criminal in possessing an automobile.2 59
Niebuhr rejects both the natural law and Marxist views of property ownership as normatively improper in a modem democratic society.2 6 He
deems natural law theory as unrealistic because property ownership can be
an offensive, as well as a defensive, weapon, and hence, exploitative.26'
He finds Marx's answer only slightly more satisfying, but ultimately
insufficient in that Marx viewed property ownership as the sole source of evil
in the world. 62 Ultimately, Niebuhr concludes that society is best served

254. Id. at 90.
255. This idea is sufficiently common in American political debate as to be labelled
passim, but was perhaps best stated in Jack Kemp's address to the 1992 Republican
Convention. Kemp indicated that the capital gains tax was a "tax on the American Dream,"
preventing poor Americans who "aspire to ownership" from reaching their goal. Kemp
indicated that recent Russian leaders had adopted the aforementioned views on property as
superior to the Marxist view, and credited the ideas as the source of victory in the Cold War.
Jack Kemp, Now We Must Change America, Address before the 1992 Republican Convention
(Aug. 18, 1992) (transcript available on Lexis in CNN Transcripts). The most recent Supreme
Court decision regarding forfeiture, United States v. James Daniel Good Property, 114 S. Ct.
492 (1993), reinforces this perspective. "[T]he case before us illustrates an essential principle:
Individual freedom finds tangible expression in property rights." Id. at 505.
256. See, e.g., Tax Reform Should Be Major Campaign Issue, ATL. J. CONST., Jan. 17,
1996, at A10.
257. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687 (1974).
258. NIEBLI-R, supra note 253, at 90. "According to the creed of democratic liberalism,
the right of property is one of the 'inalienable' rights, guaranteed by natural law. In Marxist
thought the emergence of private property represents a kind of 'Fall' in the history of
Mankind." Id.
259. 113 S. Ct. at 2809 (quoting Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 693).
260. NIEBUHR, supra note 253, at 106.
261. Id. at 99.
262. Id. "Neither [theory] understands property as a form of power which can be used in
either its individual or its social form as an instrument of particular interest against the general
interest." Id. at 106. In his critique of both philosophies of ownership, Niebuhr makes
frequent reference to John Locke. Id. at 100. The recent backlash against forfeiture abuses,
see supra text accompanying notes 40-46, is likely a perception that the Lockean "social
contract" based upon the liberal view in the United States of property ownership has been
breached by unwarranted governmental seizures.
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by recognizing that individual property varies in its economic power and
resultant potential to harm common interests.263
Niebuhr's balanced view applies especially to forfeiture practice. Forfeiture laws were originally intended to remove the "tools of the trade" from
drug dealers. 264 Early versions of the Drug Abuse Control Act targeted isolated warehouses, speedboats and other items that were especially suited to
the wholesale drug trade. 265 Not until the 1984 amendments to the Act
characterized the proceeds of illicit conduct as forfeitable did law enforcement gain novel power.26 The abuses of police power that have resulted
in public opposition to forfeiture are largely a product of the power granted
by these amendments.267
Seizure of items like speedboats and automatic weapons is not normatively troubling. Such items are "powerful" property, capable of being used
to subvert the public good. Under Niebuhr's balanced view, ownership interest in these items should be minimal. Therefore, relaxed legal standards for
their seizure are sound policy.
Conversely, the seizure of proceeds represents an excessive grant of
police power. Property does have inherently defensive, and therefore, dignifying aspects that are devalued through unmerited seizure by authorities. 26
When traditional ownership interests in property are devalued to facilitate the
war on drugs, the interests of claimants are underrepresented in the legal
proceeding.
More importantly, modem forfeiture misleads the public by the same
misperception that formed the basis of Marxist thought. 269 Despite extensive seizures of property, including the houses of those "associated ' 270 with
drug sales, the drug menace has not abated. It is misguided to view the possessions of illegal drug traffickers as the main source of the harm that drug
abuse has inflicted upon society. Not only has the seizure of houses and cars
263. NIEBUHR, supra note 253, at 118.
264. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7); see Nelson, supra note 4, at 1315. See supra note 225 for a
discussion of some of the "tools of the trade."
265. See Nelson, supra note 4 and accompanying text. See discussion at supra note 225
referring to speedboats seizures.
266. Nelson, supra note 4, at 1324.
267. Enders, supra note 249, at 61 (indicating that the 1984 amendments to the Act have
generated the recent wave of public opposition).
268. NIEBUHR, supra note 253, at 99-105.
269. Id. at 90.
270. See United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1990); United States
v. 42450 Hwy. 441, 920 F.2d 900, 901 (11th Cir. 1991). Within this context, the term
"associated" means only that probable cause has been established. This is a minimal burden,
as discussed in supra note 66, and does not necessarily indicate that the property owner
actually profits in any way from illicit activity as evidenced by the 1012 Germantown Rd.
case. United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1504-05 (11 th Cir. 1992). See
further discussion at supra text accompanying notes 200-22.
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deprived average citizens of security and dignity, it also has lent a false sense
of accomplishment to law enforcement. A proper balance in forfeiture policy
would continue to allow the seizure of instrumentalities, such as speedboats,
but prevent the seizure of proceeds from drug law violations except in the
most egregious cases.271
A balanced view of forfeiture would remove most of the incentive for
law enforcement to seize property based on its economic value rather than
on its danger to society. Much of the criticism directed at asset forfeiture has
centered around its effect on police practice.272 There is substantial evidence, much of it in the form of direct admissions, that police often direct
their general drug enforcement efforts toward seizures that will bring the
greatest return to their department. 7 3 Seizures motivated by financial considerations have received shocking media coverage, 274 which has been inte-

271. Proper guidelines for what would constitute such "egregious cases" are addressed at
infra text accompanying notes 325-27.
272. See United States v. 632-636 Ninth Ave., 798 F. Supp. 1540, 1543 (N.D. Ala. 1992)
(discussing judicial recognition of this "conflict of interest"); see also Brazil, infra note 278,
at Al and accompanying text; Schneider & Flaherty, supra note 9, at Al.
273. See Nelson, supra note 4, at 1325-32 (detailing treatment of forfeiture's corrupting
effect on the nation's police departments). Nelson provides voluminous evidence, including
excerpts from Justice Department training manuals and testimony on Capitol Hill, that demonstrates that the nation's police departments view forfeiture more as a budgetary supplement
than as a tool to deter criminal activity. See also Grant, supra note 98, at A14 (relating the
comments of Mitch Miller, a former DEA informant, who stated that agents did not affect
arrests based upon his tips while the dealers still were in possession of the narcotics, but
instead waited until the narcotics had been distributed so that the profits could be seized).
274. Covering forfeiture has also been profitable for the media. The Orlando Sentinel won
a Pulitzer Prize for a series recounting the Volusia County Sheriff's Department's program to
stop drivers southbound on 1-95 to search for cash. Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Tainted Cash
or Easy Money? Volusia Deputies Have Seized 8 Million Dollarsfrom 1-95 Motorists; The
Trap Is for Drug Dealers but Money Is the Object; 3 Out of Every 4 Drivers Are Never
Charged,ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 14 through Dec. 18, 1992, at Al (multi-part, occasional
series). The series exposed the practice by the Sheriffs office of stopping only southbound
drivers in order to seize cash instead of illegal narcotics. An investigation by the Governor's
office ensued after initial publication, and the searches were halted. Id.
An alternative publication out of Los Angeles, The Independent, has also received
recognition for its ongoing coverage of the abuses of forfeiture. See Grant, supra note 98, at
A 14. Especially noteworthy was the coverage of the death of Donald Scott, which eventually
aired on ABC's 20-20. Phil Reeves, Forfeit Your Money and Your Life; Donald Scott Was
an Innocent Man with a Very Desirable Ranch; Now He's Dead - Shot by LA Law, THE
INDEPENDENT, July 3, 1993, at A29. Reeves' story tracked the investigation of District Attorney Michael Bradbury, which concluded that Ventura County law enforcement was motivated primarily by money in its ongoing and unsuccessful attempt to prove that Donald Scott
was growing marijuana on his three million dollar ranch property. Id. Scott's wife, a witness
to her husband's shooting by the police, claimed her husband was dropping his weapon as
ordered by the police. Id. Although Bradbury's investigation was inconclusive, it did not
exonerate police and included a forensic report placing the police account of events in doubt.
Id.
This story with subsequent coverage on ABC is largely credited with turning official
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gral to recent changes in public opinion toward forfeiture.
Despite the recent shift in public opinion, police steadfastly defend forfeiture. When confronted with criticism regarding forfeiture's effect on
innocent owners, high officials are usually unsympathetic. 75 This indifference to the interests of claimants is consistent with two tenets of human
behavior identified in normative thought. First, law enforcement has become
accustomed to the steady funding that forfeiture has produced.2 76 This explanation would be consistent with Niebuhr's thesis that excess freedom and
power invariably corrupt whoever possesses it."'
Second, and more
importantly, those adversely affected by forfeiture are unlikely candidates for
sympathy from law enforcement. Available data suggests that most of those
who lose property to forfeiture populate the margins of society.27 8
Therefore, authorities are more reluctant to "value" them.279 The "valua-

sentiment towards reform of the forfeiture laws. Darryl Kelley, L.A. County Sheriff Sherman
Block Asks the Attorney Generalto Take Steps Publicly Censuringthe Ventura County District
Attorney, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1993, at BI (Bradbury report cited nationwide by critics of
forfeiture).
275. See Grant, supra note 98, at A14.
276. See United States v. James Daniel Good Property, 114 S.Ct. 492, 502 n.2 (1993)
(referring to a 1990 Justice Department request that United States Attorneys "significantly
increase production to reach our budget target"); see also Nelson, supra note 4, at 1324-26
(in part, quoting DEA officials who testified before Congress that "forfeitures produce vast
amounts of revenue. Law enforcement has the potential, through forfeiture, of producing more
income than it spends ....");David A. Kaplan et al., Where the Innocent Lose, NEWSWEEK,
Jan. 4, 1993, at 42 (Cary Copeland, Director and Chief Counsel in the Executive Office for
Asset Forfeiture, U.S. Department of Justice, described forfeiture as "the goose that laid the
golden egg.").
277. NIEBUHR, supra note 253, at 62-66, 75-76. This line of reasoning also recalls Lord
Acton's oft-quoted adage: "Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." See id.
278. Though the Justice Department does not supply information regarding the background
of those whose assets are seized due to the in rem nature of the proceedings, arrest statistics
indicate that Blacks constituted 48% of drug-related arrests in 1990. Haines, supra note 93,
at 20. A ten-month survey of drug seizure by one newspaper revealed that 77% of those who
had had money seized but were not arrested were Black, Hispanic or Asian. Schneider &
Flaherty, supra note 9, at Al. Another newspaper's survey of an ongoing forfeiture operation
indicated that 90% of those affected were Black or Hispanic. Jeff Brazil, Law Agencies' Cash
Cows to Get a Going-over in Washington - A House Panel Takes Its FirstLook at Abuses
of ForfeitureLaws, Which Are the Model for the Tactics of a Volusia County Sheriff's Drug
Squad that Has Seized Almost $8 Million, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 27, 1992, at A 1;see also
United States v. One 1987 Mercedes Benz, 1992 WL 198441 (N.D. I11.)
("If there is anything
to be learned from the Government's action in this case, it is this: don't be the only white man
attending the funeral of a black man, albeit a renown drug dealer; and accordingly, extending
that bit of sage advice to its logical conclusion, Lord help the only black man attending a
white man's funeral!") (part of court's memorandum opinion that did not find probable cause
for forfeiture). Id.
279. Law enforcement authorities do not view any of the individuals adversely affected by
forfeiture as being innocent. Indeed, they have characterized one's stand on forfeiture as dependent on whose interests are favored. In response to an amendment, proposed by Rep.
Henry Hyde, of the forfeiture laws that would shift the burden of proof, Sheriff Johnny Mack
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tion" of those negatively affected by forfeiture and of the war on drugs as a
whole is essential to a reasoned normative analysis of the policy's continued
desirability.28
Relational value theory, as espoused by Niebuhr, states that the determination of whether an action is "good" depends upon its impact on those
occupying the "center of value." 28 ' Briefly put, the desirability of any policy is measured according to whose interests are validated by the policy.282
These individuals and their interests form the center of value.283
According to the normative issues presented in the forfeiture doctrine,
those who lose property due to some association with narcotics are not likely
to be part of law enforcement's center of value. For law enforcement, the
primary motivation in enforcing the forfeiture laws is the containment of the
flow of illegal drugs. 2 4 Forfeiture clearly assists in accomplishing this
285
goal. Property seizures effectuated by previously unacceptable means
become acceptable when the broad due process values implicated are considered less important than the menace presented by the narcotics trade. Moreover, that some of these seizures involve individuals who are not "drug king-

Brown, head of the National Sheriff's Association, exclaimed, "Whose side is he on - the
drug dealers or ours?" Naftali Benavid, Second Thoughts on Forfeiture,TEX. LAW., July 26,
1993, at 18.
280. The use of the terms "value" and "valuation" is consistent with their meaning in H.
RICHARD NIEBUHR, The Center of Value, in MONOTHEISM AND WESTERN CULTURES 100
(1961) [hereinafter NIEBUHR, MONOTHEISM].
281. Hiers, supra note 251, at 132-33 (indicating that the application of relational value
theory to judicial decisions requires that a judge recognize both the policy in question and the
interests of all those affected).
282. Id. at 114-15. "Niebuhr suggests that to the extent that people experience their own
sense of meaning, identity and value by virtue of their relation to a particular center of value
of valued being, they become committed to and concerned about the well-being of other
participants in that value center or realm." Id.

283.

NIEBUHR, MONOTHEISM,

supra note 280, at 109.

284. Law enforcement views forfeiture as an indispensable tool in the drug war and
emphasizes forfeiture's potency in stopping the drug trade. "We're going to maximize
forfeitures until we can stop the drug traffickers who are out there causing problems in the
communities." Sean P. Murphy, ForfeituresHelp Finance War on Drugs, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 10, 1991, at A21 (quoting Fredrick E. Dashiell, Chief of Asset Forfeiture Division,
United States Attorney). This mindset was also expressed by the First Circuit Court of
Appeals in a 1989 decision that weighed the equities of potentially "excessive" forfeitures.
The ravages of drugs upon our nation and the billions the government is being
forced to spend upon investigation and enforcement - not to mention the cost of
drug-related crime and drug abuse treatment, rehabilitation and prevention - easily
justify a recovery in excess of the strict value of the property ....
United States v. 40 Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1989). This decision and line
of reasoning was likely overruled by the Austin decision, see supra text accompanying notes
169-92 for further discussion.
285. As the 92 Buena Vista Ave. Court noted, forfeiture represents "an important expansion
of governmental power." 113 S.Ct. at 1133. This is discussed further in supra note 153.
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pins" 28 6 is not normatively troubling if these individuals are not viewed as
"innocent." That is, they are not within the center of value.287
Measured against a center of value narrowly defined as the war on drugs,
forfeiture is a valuable tool enthusiastically embraced by police.28 To the
extent that forfeiture affected only those either in the drug trade or closely
2 89
associated with those in the trade,, the public also supported forfeiture.
Public opinion probably began to change after a wide spate of newspaper
articles containing examples of property seizures involving citizens, predominantly middle class, who were not associated with drug trafficking appeared.2 9°
Consistent with relational value theory, support for police forfeiture prac291
tices waned because the practices were now viewed as not "good for
most citizens. While police officials still view forfeiture's victims as
guilty,292 the litany of anecdotes detailing property seizures of average
citizens fueled the reform movement that led to more recent Supreme Court
decisions such as 92 Buena Vista Avenue and Austin.293

286. Despite Congress' original intent to use forfeiture against lucrative narcotics traffickers, law enforcement does not see an effective distinction between the implements of the trade,
such as speedboats or warehouses, and the property of occasional drug users or those who do
not actively prevent the illicit use of their property. Justice Dept. Replies to Guilty Series,
PITTSBURGH PRESS, Sept. 1, 1991, at B3. Cary Copeland, Director and Chief Counsel in the
Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture, United States Dept. of Justice, defended forfeiture by
stating in part, "The fact is that drug trafficking is carried out for profit - from the cartel
kingpins down to the small-time dealers. Asset forfeiture is a most effective weapon for
taking the profit out of drug trafficking." Id.
287. NIEBUHR, MONOTHEISM, supra note 280, at 109.

288. See Nelson, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
289. Id.
290. In regard to the public's growing lack of support for forfeiture, especially when
applied to the middle class, see Richard Pliskin, ForfeitureII: The Downgrade,N.J. L.J., Jan.
31, 1991, at 6 (tracking the reform movement in New Jersey forfeiture practice due to
concerns for public opinion); see also Man May Lose Farm over Marijuanain Garden, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 26, 1989, at C37 (quoting a Vermont state legislator who stated that the seizure
of farms over marihuana cultivation will lead to an erosion of public support); Michael
Slackman & Kinsey Wilson, Closer Accounting; U.S. Readies Stiffer Rules on Seized Crime
Money, NEWSDAY, Dec. 22, 1992, at A7 (quoting Justice Department officials who stated that
the widespread perception of forfeiture abuse has led to a recent decline in public support).
291. The use of the term "good for" is related to H. Richard Niebuhr's use of the term.
See NIEBUHR, MONOTHEISM, supra note 280, at 100.
292. See Nelson, supra note 4.
293. The Supreme Court's recent displeasure with modem forfeiture practice has often been
couched in "crypto-normative" terms. Hiers, supra note 251, at 111-12 (explaining that "[t]he
term 'crypto-normative' as used here refers to expressions which are ostensibly norm-neutral
or value-free, but in fact represent an unarticulated normative stance or preference"). The
Court's language has included, for example: "[T]he burden of persuading us that Congress
intended such an inequitable result is especially heavy." 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at
1135 (emphasis added); "[F]airprocedures are not confined to the innocent." James Daniel
Good, 114 S. Ct. at 505 (emphasis added); "But the dramatic variations in the value of
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The shift in public opinion that led to the reform movement can be explained by relational value theory. Forfeiture was presented to the public as
"poetic justice" since the "criminals," not the tax-paying public, would pay

for the war on drugs. 294 The wide reach of police power granted by the
amendments to the Drug Abuse Control Act gave rise to a normatively predictable result. Not only did the amendments empower police, but they also
greatly enhanced the incentives for using that power.295 Inevitably, the potential for financial gains to financially strapped law enforcement agencies
became too attractive to expect restraint. 296 The combination of this incentive and more traditional police mindsets resulted in the zealous pursuit of
forfeitable items, which occasionally led to overreaching by law enforcement
inconsistent with legislative goals.297
Ultimately, law enforcement intruded upon the populace's center of value
because police used forfeiture to seize the property of citizens who did not
fit the average conception of a drug dealer.29' Thus, public opinion, first
expressed through the press 299 and later through the judiciary,0 0 realigned
itself to be consistent with the perceived threat to this center. While fighting
the drug menace by seizing the luxury property of drug kingpins was good
for the general public, seizing the houses of casual drug users and others
whose property was unwittingly used for drug sales struck too close to home.
The perception of forfeiture's actual effect on the center of value shifted
accordingly. This shift has probably produced the recent retrenchment in
public approval for forfeiture as a legitimate law enforcement tool.

property forfeitable ... undercut any similar argument [justifying forfeiture]." Austin v.
United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993) (emphasis added); "[T]he misuse of the hated
general warrant is often cited as an important cause of the American Revolution." 92 Buena
Vista, 113 S.Ct. at 1131 (analogizing modem forfeiture to the English "writs of assistance")
(emphasis added). In this respect, the Court is fulfilling its role as the "societal conscience."
Hiers, supra note 251, at 125.
294. Nelson, supra note 4, at 1310 n.5 (citing The Oversight of "High Risk" Asset
ForfeitureProgramsat the Justice Departmentand the Customs Service: HearingBefore the
Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 10 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1990)).
295. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). See supra notes 273-76 for further discussion of the incentives
to police departments.
296. United States v. 429 S.Main St., 52 F.3d 1416, 1419 (6th Cir. 1995).
297. See generally Nelson, supra note 4.
298. See Pliskin, supra note 290.
299. Richard Hiers, Ethics and the Media in a Democratic Society, Danforth Associates'
Southeast Spring Conference, Mar. 29, 1990, at 12 (published in ESSAYS ON ETHIcs, LAW
AND PUBLIC POLICY, for the exclusive use of students in the Seminar on Law, Ethics and
Public Policy, Holland Law Center, University of Florida). Hiers explains that, in its ideal
role, the media can function as a watchdog and positively influence public policy through
disclosure of official abuse. Id.
300. See 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S.Ct. at 1132 (equating forfeiture with tyrannical
British practices that fomented the American Revolution). For a more detailed listing of
judicial displeasure with forfeiture practice, see supra note 198.
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Three recent Supreme Court rulings on forfeiture practice3 ' reflect
greater concern for the interests of citizens who occupy the general center of
value. The Court's attempt to mitigate forfeiture's harshness through these
holdings indicates consideration for citizens who do not fit the definition of
drug kingpins, but have substantial property interests threatened by forfeiture.
In 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 30 2 the Court ruled that the relation-back doctrine
does not vest title to tainted property in the government at the moment of its
illegal use.303 This rule protects transferees who receive the property after
such use. The innocent owner, who stands to lose property due to the acts
of previous owners, has been hailed as one of forfeiture's greatest victims. 30 4 Not surprisingly, this has most often occurred when the interests
of those in the public's center of value are affected.30 5 Accordingly, the
Court's holding affords greater protection to these interests. In addition, the
92 Buena Vista Avenue Court expanded the availability of the innocent-owner
defense to donees,3 °6 potentially in recognition of the commonality of gift
transactions within families.3 7
Of the three decisions, the Austin holding is perhaps the most helpful to
claimants not actively involved in the drug trade. 30 ' The Court's ruling that
the value of property seized cannot be "excessive" in light of the offense
charged 3" effectively protects the family home from forfeiture due to minimal drug infractions. 310 Austin is the only one of the decisions that is of
no conceivable help to drug kingpins, the original targets of forfeiture.31
301. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126; Austin, 113 S. Ct. 2801; James Daniel Good,
114 S. Ct. 492.
302. 113 S. Ct. 1126.
303. Id. at 1134. See supra note 77 and supra text accompanying notes 155-60 for a
discussion of the relation-back doctrine.
304. See Saltzburg, supra note 124, at 227-32 (revealing the function of the relation-back
doctrine and the resultant subordination of innocent ownership interests in forfeited property
to the government's interest); see also Enders, supra note 249 (providing anecdotes of subsequent purchasers who stand to lose property due to the acts of previous owners, and the
formation of advocacy groups to fight such forfeiture actions).
305. In this instance, the public's "sense of meaning" allows them to relate to the stories
of otherwise innocent citizens who lose valuable property due to minimal illicit drug use by
others, especially family members. For a more detailed discussion, see supra note 290.
306. 113 S. Ct. at 1143-44. See further discussion at supra note 154.
307. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1135. Though the Court did not explicitly mention
intra-family gifts, common knowledge suggests that such transactions are most common
among family. In addition, the Court did note that limiting the innocent-owner defense to
purchasers would be an "inequitable result." Id.
308. Austin, 113 S.Ct. 2801.
309. The Court did not announce exactly what would constitute an "excessive" forfeiture.
Id.
310. Id. at 2810-12. See discussion at supra text accompanying notes 189-90 regarding
disparity between offense and property confiscated.
311. See supra note 95 for a discussion of the original intent of the Drug Abuse Control
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Since those who profit heavily from drug trafficking invariably are involved
in extensive violations of the narcotics laws, proportionality would not save
portions of their property interests. Thus, the Austin Court's application of
the Eighth Amendment to forfeiture expressly and exclusively protects the interests of those in the general public's center of value.3 12
VI.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Many of the most effective checks on forfeiture abuse have already been
legalized" 3 or at least proposed.3 14 However, four additional reforms,
two aimed at the judicial process and two at law enforcement behavior, could
help produce a forfeiture practice that takes into greater account the interests

312. James Daniel Good, 114 S. Ct. at 502. The James Daniel Good holding is
particularly helpful to those whose primary residence is threatened by forfeiture. Id. The
Court ruled as a matter of law that the government cannot seize real property prior to an adversarial hearing on the merits of the forfeiture. See supra note 123 for a discussion of the
due process standard. Before the James Daniel Good decision, claimants wanting to contest
forfeiture of their residences were still forced to vacate them during the pendency of the
proceedings, as the in rem nature of the proceeding required seizure of the res to acquire
jurisdiction. 114 S. Ct. at 502. Alternatively, the former "owner" of the property could enter
an agreement with the government which would allow the former owner to continue to occupy
what was previously his home in return for rental payments to the United States Marshal. Id.
at 497. This burden alone could mean that potentially valid claims could not be pursued due
to lack of resources.
Seizure actions also stripped claimants of their dignity and security by forcing them to
either vacate their homes or make "rental" payments to the government. "At stake in this and
many other forfeiture cases are the security and privacy of the home and those who take
shelter within it." Id. at 505. Reason dictates that drug kingpins will not substantially benefit
from the James Daniel Good holding because they have the resources, including other residences, necessary to contest forfeiture. Therefore, they would not be severely inconvenienced
by prejudgment seizure. Thus, the James Daniel Good decision, like the Austin decision, primarily protects those who stand to lose their residences due to the acts of third parties or
because of minimal offenses. Most importantly, those threatened under either scenario would
fit within the general public's center of value. Therefore, the Court's ruling reflects an attempt
to conform forfeiture practice to address those "valued" interests, consistent with relationalvalue theory.
313. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126; Austin, 113 S. Ct. 2801; James Daniel Good,
114 S. Ct. 492. See supra section V (listing the Supreme Court's recent limitations on governmental power).
314. See supra note 41 indicating that both House and Senate subcommittees are
considering legislation to address the balance of power in forfeiture proceedings, including one
proposal to shift the burden of proof to the government throughout the process.
Michael Schecter has offered four valid suggestions to ameliorate the forfeiture system:
(1) not allowing forfeiture when small amounts of drugs are discovered unless independent
evidence of drug trafficking exists, (2) eliminating forfeiture for the acts of third parties, (3)
requiring courts to "examine the equities" of every forfeiture, and (4) allowing laches as an
affirmative defense (presently inapplicable against the United States). Schecter, supra note
4, at 1178-82.
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of all affected parties.3" 5
First, the government's standard of proof should be heightened.
Presently, the government need only show probable cause to initiate forfeiture and shift the burden to the claimant, who must then meet the arguably
higher standard of a preponderance of the evidence." 6 Since forfeiture pits
the power of the federal government against the individual, the standard
should be more reasonably set at the clear and convincing evidence level.
While not as burdensome as the criminal level of beyond a reasonable doubt,
the clear and convincing evidence standard reflects that forfeiture threatens
substantial private property interests based upon pseudo-criminal allegations
of wrongdoing. Before such significant interests are surrendered forcefully
to the government, the government should prove the wrong doing, at least to
the level of this standard.
Second, whenever possible, forfeiture should proceed in personam, not
in rem. The in rem nature of the proceedings produces absurd results 1 7 and
gives the government too many procedural advantages.318 More importantly, in personam jurisdiction more logically addresses the circumstances of
modem forfeiture.
The in rem nature of forfeiture proceedings is a vestige of its origins in
admiralty.3" 9 The rationales that have justified the doctrine in admiralty,
that is, multiple, untraceable ownership and mobile property, 320 are for the
most part not applicable to modem forfeiture. Absent these special circumstances, forfeiture is more equitably pursued by moving against the known
owner of the property. Making the owner of the property a named party
would ensure proper notice and afford opportunity for discovery.
Third, the 1978 amendment to the Drug Abuse Control Act that allowed
police to seize the proceeds of drug trafficking3"2' should be limited to the
most egregious circumstances. Such circumstances would include the ownership of vast luxury properties and large cash reserves, consistent with the
possessions of drug kingpins or traffickers originally targeted by the statute.322 Allowing this limited exception would still enable police to use for-

315. Id. Forfeiture has too often been administered without consideration for those whose
property has been seized. Id. Instead, the focus has been on law enforcement resources and
the public's need to control drug proliferation. Id.
316. See the discussion in supra notes 66-67 on probable cause.
317. See United States v. 632-636 Ninth Ave., 798 F. Supp. 1540, 1543 (N.D. Ala. 1992).
The in rem nature of forfeiture is discussed in supra note 54.
318. See Nelson, supra note 4, at 1319-20 (listing the advantages that in rem jurisdiction
affords the government).
319. Schecter, supra note 4, at 1154-55.
320. Id.
321. Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301(a), 92 Stat. 3768,
3777 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988)).
322. id. For a discussion of the original intent of the Act, see supra notes 35 & 95.
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feiture in a strike against the economic base of illegal narcotic magnates.32 3
Furthermore, law enforcement could still seize real property shown to have
facilitated the illicit sale of drugs.324 In contrast, property subject to forfeiture only because it had been purchased in some degree with the proceeds
of unrelated drug sales is too tenuous a link to justify taking the property of
citizens who are not involved in ongoing drug sales.
Lastly, law enforcement agencies should not be permitted to retain all of
the revenue from their forfeiture of property under the Drug Abuse Control
Act. If forfeiture represents sound crime prevention policy, it must stand on
its own without having to give law enforcement incentives. The present
incentives have led to abuses 325 and the amassing of unseemly war chests
by law enforcement at the expense of the citizenry they serve.326
Instead of being returned to the law enforcement agency, seized property
should go to either the state government or the federal treasury. Its allocation should be controlled by politically accountable officials consistent with
agreed upon goals. Lacking direct control over the assets, police would have
no incentive to prioritize drug enforcement by the expected rate of return.
This reform alone would increase public confidence in forfeiture.327
VII.

CONCLUSION

Forfeiture under the Drug Abuse Control Act has long represented an
unacceptable sacrifice of civil liberties in order to employ a novel weapon
against unchecked drug trafficking. Congressional intent to provide a wide
range of forfeitable assets and encourage police pursuit of those assets has
resulted in an unfortunate, but predictable, excess of police zeal. Both the
simplified forfeiture procedures adopted by the courts and the courts'
reluctance to employ traditional equitable powers have exacerbated the prob-

323. Part of the original intent of the Act was to deplete the economic base of drug
traffickers who flouted the laws through their access to high-priced legal talent. See Caplin
& Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 630 (1989). The reference to the
economic base probably reflects the frustration of convicting drug traffickers who then serve
short prison terms and return to their luxurious lifestyles which they had gained through the
drug trade profits.
324. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(1)-(4) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (the original items designated as
forfeitable under the statute included equipment, storage facilities and transport used for drug
trafficking). For a more detailed discussion of this distinction, see supra note 225.
325. See Nelson, supra note 4 and accompanying text; Schneider & Flaherty, supra note
9, at Al; Brazil & Berry, supra note 274, at Al.
326. For instance, the Volusia County Sheriff's Office has over $8 million in cash seized
from motorists under forfeiture laws. Brazil & Berry, supra note 274, at Al and accompanying text.
327. The Supreme Court noted in James Daniel Good that "it makes sense to scrutinize
governmental action more closely when the State stands to benefit." 114 S. Ct. at 502
(quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 978 n.9 (1991)).

188

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA W AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 7

lem.
The lower federal courts, however, began to check police overreaching
and protect citizens whom the equities favored. First, the district courts
began to articulate normative concerns for the interests of claimants.
Selected circuit courts, including the Eleventh Circuit, soon followed.
In 1993, three Supreme Court decisions also attempted to correct this
anomaly. That three decisions were handed down from the Court within ten
months, after nineteen years of silence on the subject, points to the
seriousness of the Court's intent in addressing forfeiture's problems. This
concern is also reflected in the Court's application of the Eighth Amendment
to forfeiture. Traditionally, the Court has hesitated to apply this amendment.328 Combined with proposed reforms in Congress, it appears that the
interests of all citizens are now being duly considered. Ultimately, this shift
in policy can be attributed to the fact that forfeiture, as formerly practiced,
was no longer viewed as good for the public interest, and thus, became
normatively unacceptable. The Court's limitations on governmental power,
combined with additional congressional reforms, should preserve the vitality
of forfeiture as a drug enforcement tool, while still protecting the interests of
all affected parties.
Rick Fueyo

328. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) ("[O]utside of the context of capital
punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been
exceedingly rare.").

